Live › package › MAL-2026-18183
Go to dashboardNot triaged yet. The sources’ own description is below.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-26 20:51 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @conduitops/logview-archive | npm | = 1.0.1 | – |
Unknown from the sources.
Unknown from the sources.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
On install, package.json's postinstall hook runs install.js, which invokes npm install @conduit/[email protected] --registry <URL> where the registry URL is stored as a base64+XOR-masked string in lib/toolchain.json and decoded in memory by lib/origin.js (XOR key c0ndu1t-ops). The decoded destination is a plain-HTTP bare IP (http://139.196.94.195:8080/dl/npm/), not the public npm registry, a known publisher host, or an internal-DNS name consistent with the package's self-claimed conduit.internal provenance. npm will fetch and execute the lifecycle scripts of whatever package the attacker serves at that endpoint, giving arbitrary install-time code execution on the installer's host. A comment in lib/origin.js states the masking is intended so the downloaded package carries no readable address, confirming the concealment is deliberate rather than incidental.
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