---
id: "MAL-2026-17712"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-17712"]
title: "Malicious code in ig-gox (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "ig-gox", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 1.0.0", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-10-09T02:53:23+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:59+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:08:21+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17712", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:59+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in ig-gox (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:ig-gox affected = 1.0.0 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:59+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17712

## From the sources

Importing ig_gox runs ig_gox/__init__.py, which decodes a blob (base64, XOR, zlib) after a few anti-debugging checks and execs it as __main__. The decoded loader only goes on if it looks like a physical Android device running Termux (it turns away x86, emulators and VMs), installs requests and cryptography if they are missing, downloads encrypted code from https://goxtools.shop/api/admin/storage.php, decrypts it with AES-256-CBC and runs it in memory. The README only calls it a runtime engine for Termux. I decoded the loader statically and did not see what the downloaded code does. I read 1.0.0 and did not run it.

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (9b31f8ba5b2167be45b02cd3bbf840873adf76369e3ac472f1cccfc4a0579fff)
The pypi package ig-gox ships a top-level ig_gox/__init__.py that, on import (the README's documented usage), base64-decodes a ~5 KB embedded blob, XOR-decrypts it with a hardcoded key, zlib-decompresses it, HMAC-verifies it, then exec/compiles the resulting Python under __name__='__main__'. The visible wrapper has no other functionality; all actual behavior of the package is contained in that concealed blob. Before decoding, the module performs anti-analysis checks: it calls sys.exit(0) if sys.gettrace() returns a tracer, if the process environment/cwd/argv contain substrings such as 'uncompyle', 'pycdc', 'decompyle', 'deobfuscate', 'hook', or 'frida', and it tampers with references to builtins.exec/eval/compile. The combination of a hidden exec-of-decoded-payload reached automatically on import and explicit evasions against debuggers and decompilers is deliberate concealment of code execution from the installer and from reviewers.

## Source: kam193 (780638a0747103eb44a85312a2cfb552981e498655f638c5baf86eb4a5f74042)
Package hides obfuscated code aimed to avoid analysis and downloading the remote stage. The remote code is used to abuse Instagram service for mass fake account registration.


---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-10-ig-gox


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.


 - obfuscation


 - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.


 - abusing-3rd-api

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_