Malicious code in lore-cs (PyPI)

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Source: amazon-inspector (f84e496d81c3e514ec784db2d5996a9015fa9f01f50cb75a99011eb348b2aa07)

lore-cs 1.0.0 executes an outbound HTTP POST both from setup.py (at install time) and from lore_cs/init.py (at import time) to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plaintext HTTP. The payload includes the installer's hostname, install path, current working directory, and package name. The import-time beacon fires on every import, so the behavior also triggers in environments where pip build isolation would otherwise contain setup.py side effects. The destination is a hardcoded author-controlled bare IP not configured by the installer, and the package self-labels as a dependency-confusion canary while performing unauthenticated host-identifier collection against anyone who installs or imports it.

Source: kam193 (ae8b741b7c90400c3a5f4ba13533b1a6a75134f768934834b591c8df23eecb83)

During installation or import, the package exfiltrates basic information in a dependency confusion attempt. The user identifies themselves as a HackerOne user abusing the PyPI for the purpose of a bug bounty program.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-hackerone-bugbounty

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

• dependency-confusion