---
id: "MAL-2026-17469"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-17469"]
title: "Malicious code in infrabench (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "infrabench", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 0.1.0; = 0.1.1; = 0.2.0", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-10-03T16:21:40+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:58+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:08:21+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17469", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:58+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in infrabench (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:infrabench affected = 0.1.0; = 0.1.1; = 0.2.0 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:58+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17469

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (97f8f2854fc15ef2f2a5d4c44b050aa9f3c87a7f5a832949390cf22ccd7882a6)
The package's public API harness.run(edge=<host>) downloads two sha256-pinned gzipped native binaries ('inference-core.bin.gz' and 'edge-conn.bin.gz') from https://<edge>/files/, chmods them 0755, and spawns them on the installer's host. The caller-supplied edge argument chooses only the delivery CDN; the binary contents are fixed by the author via the pinned hashes. The surrounding Python code emits a synthetic, deterministic progress trace (fabricated step/loss/tok-s lines) rather than real benchmark data, so the advertised 'evaluation harness' purpose does not match the behavior of the fetched code. The JSON configuration passed to the 'inference-core' binary — pools:[{url,user,pass:'vox',keepalive,tls}], cpu:{enabled,threads,mem-locked}, cache-budget, log-period, autosave — matches the xmrig-family mining-pool client schema rather than any inference or benchmarking worker schema, and the second binary (~19MB) is invoked as 'access tcp --hostname <host> --url 127.0.0.1:<port>', the Cloudflare cloudflared access-tunnel CLI shape used to reach a pool endpoint behind a tunnel. A _hb() routine additionally POSTs run id, state, and up to 4000 characters of exception traceback to https://<edge>/hb as an operator heartbeat/control-plane check-in. Installing and invoking the harness causes the installer's machine to execute author-controlled native code and donate CPU to an operator-controlled mining pool under a fake benchmarking cover story.

## Source: kam193 (4abc7154004498e9054ca8ac239acd73ab86815f6029ad5d52e4c883488f4c70)
The package imitates real activity and instead deploys a coin miner.


---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-10-voxeval


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - cryptominer

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_