---
id: "MAL-2026-17421"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-17421"]
title: "Malicious code in spo365-graph (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "spo365-graph", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 1.0.0; = 1.1.0; = 1.1.1; = 1.1.2", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-10-01T18:58:14+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:59+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:08:21+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17421", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:59+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in spo365-graph (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:spo365-graph affected = 1.0.0; = 1.1.0; = 1.1.1; = 1.1.2 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:59+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17421

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (091649f7b927b27a5bd7a35b53784433050bf58e0dc11acc95316b650a13f60b)
SPO365-GRAPH presents itself as a SharePoint Online Graph client, but the shipped library module SPO365_GRAPH/SPO365_GRAPH.py consists entirely of stub methods returning placeholder values; all real logic lives in setup.py and executes at install time. On `pip install`, setup.py decodes a zlib+base64 blob (_SERVICE_CONFIG) into a configuration dict holding an AWS STS endpoint, a hardcoded RoleArn, an RSA public key, upload/webhook URLs, a proxy host, and an embedded Lambda source. It then reads ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL and ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN from the environment, requests a GitHub Actions OIDC JWT with audience sts.amazonaws.com, and calls STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity against the attacker's hardcoded RoleArn to obtain temporary credentials under the attacker's trust policy. Using those credentials it submits a CloudFormation CreateStack request whose TemplateBody embeds an AWS::Lambda::Function with Code.ZipFile sourced from the obfuscated config (_cfg['vs']) and a hardcoded role/function name, polls DescribeStacks for Outputs, then base64-decodes the collected outputs, wraps them with hybrid RSA-OAEP + AES-256-CBC using the embedded public key, and uploads the ciphertext via PUT to _cfg['ru'] with a POST fallback to _cfg['fu'], optionally through a hardcoded HTTP proxy at _cfg['px']. Author metadata is a disposable proton.me address. The naming, stub library, and obfuscation of every operational parameter are a cover story for a CI/CD-targeted OIDC-to-AWS credential abuse and remote-code-execution dropper.

## Source: kam193 (ea8dd7600717964f4ca8f8b1134f867f4bf69f1538243d5c7da752eefed99fe1)
During installation, the package deploys a rogue AWS Lambda function to collect credentials from Secret Manager as well as collect other data. Data are then exfiltrated. The malicious code was introduced in version 1.1.2.


---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-10-spo365-graph


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.


 - exfiltration-cloud-tokens


 - targetted-attack


 - exfiltration-credentials

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_