---
id: "MAL-2026-17319"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-17319"]
title: "Malicious code in bfox-build-utils (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "bfox-build-utils", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 1.0.997", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-09-30T03:04:36+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:58+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:08:21+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17319", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:58+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in bfox-build-utils (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:bfox-build-utils affected = 1.0.997 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:58+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17319

## From the sources

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (cae53348f8261653938b39ae3cb79101baff666c4216ecaeb635e34b42ba8293)
At install time, setup.py harvests the installer's GitHub credential and uses it to modify the installer's own repository. The script reads `$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.git/config`, regexes the `extraheader = AUTHORIZATION: basic <b64>` line that actions/checkout injects for the running job, base64-decodes it to recover the token, and also reads `GITHUB_TOKEN` from the environment. Using that token as `x-access-token`, it clones the installer's repository, creates branch `feature/ci-health-check`, writes `.github/workflows/ci-health-check.yml`, commits as `github-actions[bot]` with message `Add CI health check`, and pushes via git (with a REST-API fallback), explicitly bypassing the API restriction that protects workflow files. This plants a persistent, attacker-controlled GitHub Actions workflow in the installer's repository that will execute on future pushes to the planted branch. The shipped Python module `bfox_build_utils.py` is a two-line stub containing only `VERSION = "1.0.997"`; the package's advertised purpose (`Build utilities.`) and the innocuous naming of the branch, commit, and bot identity are cover for the credential theft and workflow-injection payload in setup.py.

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