---
id: "MAL-2026-17240"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-17240"]
title: "Malicious code in aseitylab (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "aseitylab", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 0.1.0; = 0.1.1", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-09-28T21:24:44+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:52:02+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:08:21+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17240", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:52:02+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in aseitylab (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:aseitylab affected = 0.1.0; = 0.1.1 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:52:02+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17240

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (9b47f0f7a0776cad3d4c83604d35a0023a250d2f035e58129233095aa2b110a3)
aseitylab/_shimdata.py contains a large base85-encoded, zlib-compressed blob stored as DATA. aseitylab/compat.py defines _ensure_compat(), which base85-decodes and zlib-inflates DATA and passes the result to exec(compile(..., '<aseitylab-compat>', 'exec')). setup.py imports aseitylab.compat and invokes _ensure_compat() during package build/install, and aseitylab/__init__.py calls the same function on every import, so the decoded payload runs both when the package is installed and whenever it is imported. Execution is gated by environment variables (ASEITYLAB_COMPAT=0, DAS_STAGED=1) that allow the payload to be suppressed in build or test environments. The README advertises a pure-Python task-orchestration toolkit with no runtime dependencies, which does not require a compressed, encoded executable blob shipped as 'compatibility shim data'. MANIFEST.in additionally excludes file names (loader_payload.py, make_armed.py, armed.json, manifest.benign.json) consistent with a build harness that produces separate 'armed' and 'benign' tarballs. The contents of the executed payload are not inspectable from the shipped source; installing or importing the package hands arbitrary code execution to whatever DATA decodes to.

## Source: kam193 (24b99c2059065cbe44f7dac2f1d2878b237c58150c0890baa1856852e76fcb24)
During installation, obfuscated code is used to fetch code hidden in an image containing a Python application with a native extension module. This module holds an obfuscated infostealer which collects sensitive data and exfiltrates them to a C2 server retrieved from transaction history in the Polygon blockchain.


---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-09-donutautosellsrc


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - infostealer


 - Downloads and executes a remote executable.


 - obfuscation


 - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.


 - malware


 - native-extension


 - steganography


 - c2-in-blockchain

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_