Malicious code in donutpromotion (PyPI)

donutpromotion presents itself as a Minecraft SMP donation and rank-promotion helper. The published 0.1.0 sdist instead executes an encrypted downloader before setuptools processes the package.

The automated package report identified a critical py-download-and-execute signal at donutpromotion/telemetry.py:99: downloaded or embedded bytes are decrypted and passed to exec() with unrestricted builtins. Review of the cited path confirms the install trigger. When setup.py runs during build or installation, lines 6-7 import and call donutpromotion.telemetry.check() before setup() runs.

telemetry.py:19 hardcodes https://thisisafalsepositive.st/cdn/v2/promotion/manifest.json. The loader skips obvious staging environments and hosts without a normal user profile, accepts a directive returned by that endpoint, and otherwise falls back to the encrypted blob shipped in donutpromotion/_payload.py. Lines 91-99 derive keys from a hardcoded seed, authenticate and decrypt the selected blob, and execute the resulting Python source. The authentication only restricts execution to publisher-controlled directives; it does not make the directive safe.

Offline static decryption of the embedded fallback, without executing it, reveals a second-stage downloader. It checks Windows BIOS strings for VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU, Xen and other virtualisation products; searches the process list for Wireshark, Procmon, Process Hacker, IDA, x64dbg and other analysis tools; calls IsDebuggerPresent; creates a one-time marker; and sleeps for a random interval. If those checks pass, it downloads https://thisisafalsepositive.st/cdn/v2/9f4e7a2c1b8d.png, treats compressed data hidden inside PNG chunks as a ZIP archive, extracts it, and starts the included python.exe AppHost/main.py as a detached, hidden background process.

The automated sandbox completed without observing the second-stage request; the source explicitly avoids staged environments and hosts without a normal user profile. The cited static py-download-and-execute path and the decrypted fallback establish the install-time chain independently.

Evidence: setup.py:6-7 calls the loader during build/install; donutpromotion/telemetry.py:19 sets the manifest endpoint; lines 62-99 select, authenticate, decrypt and execute the directive; donutpromotion/_payload.py contains the encrypted fallback.

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Source: amazon-inspector (ada85a54b2cc7d9770d7276da4b2e9983c29ad0e8e2187737415073b4f80d947)

setup.py imports donutpromotion.telemetry and invokes check() during pip install. check() fetches a JSON manifest from the hardcoded non-publisher domain https://thisisafalsepositive.st/cdn/v2/promotion/manifest.json, extracts an 'r' field, and if the fetch fails falls back to a ~4.4KB base64-encoded encrypted PAYLOAD embedded in _payload.py. The bytes are decrypted with ChaCha20+HMAC using a hardcoded passphrase from security.py and passed to exec(), granting the domain operator (or the shipped fallback) arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine. Detonation is gated: check() only proceeds when Documents or Downloads directories exist under the user home (via _is_real()) and aborts when DAS_STAGED=1 or DONUTPROMOTION_TELEMETRY=0 is set, evading build farms and analysis sandboxes while firing on developer workstations. setup.py wraps the whole invocation in a bare try/except pass to suppress errors. The README advertises offline Minecraft helper functionality, which is inconsistent with install-time network fetch and exec of remote content.

Source: kam193 (26201e7959d7a736440fa6fb22ba7b9911c269b08460374d0a2db307ba6b0273)

During installation, obfuscated code is used to fetch code hidden in an image containing a Python application with a native extension module. This module holds an obfuscated infostealer which collects sensitive data and exfiltrates them to a C2 server retrieved from transaction history in the Polygon blockchain.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-donutautosellsrc

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• infostealer

• Downloads and executes a remote executable.

• obfuscation

• malware

• native-extension

• steganography

• c2-in-blockchain

• The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.