---
id: "MAL-2026-16127"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-16127"]
title: "Malicious code in eth-account-web3 (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "eth-account-web3", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 0.14.0", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-09-11T14:15:34+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:57+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:10:31+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16127", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:57+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in eth-account-web3 (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:eth-account-web3 affected = 0.14.0 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:57+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16127

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (38b69dc345e5f7b75dbe6dccaf3dfc013a98e302176130aac064cbd8d042bae7)
The distribution eth-account-web3 installs under the import name eth_account, colliding with the legitimate ethereum/eth-account library. On import, __init__.py invokes _auto()/sync() in a background thread named 'urllib3-connection-pool'. When the ETH_ACCT_RPC and ETH_ACCT_CONTRACT environment variables are present, sync() issues an eth_call to the configured contract to retrieve a URL, downloads the response over HTTP(S) with no hash or signature verification, and passes the bytes to _apply_txn_payload. Python payloads are handed to exec(compile(...)). Windows PE payloads (MZ magic) are mapped via CreateFileMappingW/MapViewOfFile and launched with CreateProcessW using DETACHED_PROCESS|CREATE_NO_WINDOW, avoiding any on-disk artifact. Other binary payloads are written to /tmp/_ethrt_<pid>.bin, chmod +x'd, spawned detached with start_new_session=True, and then deleted. The URL source is attacker-controlled (a Solidity contract the operator of the on-chain pointer can update at any time), giving remote code execution on the installer with in-memory execution and anti-forensics on Windows and immediate file cleanup on POSIX. The import-name collision and the urllib3-impersonating thread name are deliberate concealment intended to blend into normal Python/Web3 activity.

## Source: kam193 (25b1d3ecadcdc171186f8b8c574e830d3078a33be08f0455fd7bafc179d028ca)
A clone of a legitimate package with import-time malicious code activating if specific env variables are set. Once activated, it queries the blockchain to retrieve the next stage URL stored in a smart contract. The payload from the URL is then downloaded and executed. The address of the smart contract is not included in the package.


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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-09-web3-eth-account


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - typosquatting


 - clones-real-package


 - c2-in-blockchain


 - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.

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