---
id: "MAL-2026-15934"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-15934"]
title: "Malicious code in dbt-sa-cli (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "dbt-sa-cli", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 0.0.1", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-09-05T05:59:33+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:56+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:10:31+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-15934", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:56+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in dbt-sa-cli (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:dbt-sa-cli affected = 0.0.1 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:56+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-15934

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (9a3fc52d1baa65bd51dd9659641f0df237ea2a595358cd91b19fd8988ba3236a)
setup.py defines rce_poc() and invokes it at module top level, so the code runs unconditionally during `pip install dbt-sa-cli`. The function collects installer-side identifiers (hostname, USER/USERNAME, current working directory, home path) and sends them out-of-band via a DNS lookup to a subdomain of yokodnssmamqdchvjfyqyo8zaq3s90h8e.oast.fun and an HTTPS POST to https://yokodnssmamqdchvjfyqyo8zaq3s90h8e.oast.fun/dbt-sa-cli. The same install-time path drops a marker file at ~/.dbt-sa-cli-rce-poc in the installer's home directory, demonstrating arbitrary code execution during install. The package name resembles the dbt ecosystem, making this a typosquat lure. Regardless of any 'security research' framing, installing the package produces immediate installer-side data disclosure and code execution against an author-controlled OOB collector.

## Source: kam193 (23702c2370cf8873f90f85f178de5d781c9244f91fe412c952fc3cca8e98f974)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.


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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.


Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

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