--- id: "MAL-2026-15926" kind: "package" aliases: ["MAL-2026-15926"] title: "Malicious code in astlsi (PyPI)" severity: "critical" cvss: null epss: null exploited: false status: "open" category: "package" products: [{"name": "astlsi", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 0.1.0", "ecosystem": "pypi"}] ecosystems: ["pypi"] tags: ["malicious", "package"] not_affected_if: [] published_at: "2026-09-04T10:24:22+00:00" first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:56+00:00" updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:12:36+00:00" sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-15926", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:56+00:00"}] --- # Malicious code in astlsi (PyPI) ## Affected - pypi:astlsi affected = 0.1.0 fixed ? ## Timeline - 2026-10-26T20:51:56+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-15926 ## From the sources --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (222a62d677f99497f67476b9cc87886c05fb2a08827430934fb518798abb8339) The package presents itself as a proxy health-check utility, but its exported starts() function walks /storage/emulated/0/ (Android user-storage), collects files with source/document extensions (.py,.json,.txt,.html,.php), packs them into a zip archive, and POSTs the archive to https://tapi.bale.ai//sendDocument with chat_id 5263487757. The Bale bot token and chat id are hardcoded in the module. The proxy-latency scaffolding around this call performs no real proxy check and serves as a cover story for the single exfiltration request. ## Source: kam193 (902508cd9285413782c405b438e21f1f29787d38aba7badf71aeb4e0b632b9b6) The provided functionality hides code that exfiltrates files to a remote location. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-asti Reasons (based on the campaign): - files-exfiltration - action-hidden-in-lib-usage - target:android --- _Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_