Malicious code in @sudobility/indexer_client (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (b374713629b9be645f22b21fab5376e57a55d3001c72a1e55e1e8dfb6e40a27b)

The package's postinstall hook executes scripts/miner.sh, which uses curl to download a gzipped payload from https://amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com/ (a presigned S3 URL embedding AWSAccessKeyId <redacted>), decompresses it to /tmp/.smi, and runs it. When executed as root or when passwordless sudo is available, it invokes /tmp/.smi agent with elevated privileges to perform a persistent agent install (the script's own comments reference stealth renames, cron, and tor/relay components). In the unprivileged branch it extracts an embedded XMRig binary, writes a hardcoded Monero pool configuration to $HOME/.sysmond.json, copies the binary into $HOME/.local/lib/ under a randomized system-component name drawn from a list including edid-mon, smmon, irqstatsd, and kmod-cache, and launches it via nohup in the background. A second attacker-controlled endpoint networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 is referenced for relay/C2. The S3 URL also exposes a third-party AWS access key as an IOC.

Source: ghsa-malware (5a43ad883ba6263301ef81f0542c032a5ee45d5c85017db602cd5512bf98358d)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.