GHSA-rxf3-qgpv-wxvr · AI agents & MCP
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
The mcp-gateway-registry management API checks who is logged in but not what they are allowed to do, so an authenticated low-privilege user can call the group import endpoint and map their own identity-provider group to the registry administrator scope. The new admin rights apply on the next request without re-login, giving control over every registered MCP gateway asset.
first public Nov 11, 2026 · 1 source
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Teams that run mcp-gateway-registry at versions 1.0.9 through 1.24.7 where authenticated users can reach the external management API. The sources say the flaw lets a low-privilege authenticated user escalate, so exposure depends on who holds an account. Deployments on 1.25.0 or later are not affected by the write-path flaw, but a privileged mapping created earlier still grants admin access and must be reviewed.
Not affected if no-authenticated-low-privilege-users, version-1.25.0-or-later
Who cares aws, lab-disclosure, mcp, mcp-gateway-registry, self-hosted
>= 1.0.9 and <= 1.24.7 are affected.POST /api/servers/groups/import requests from non-administrator accounts.group_mappings and ui_permissions entries in the mcp_scopes DocumentDB collection for mappings to or grants of a mutating action to all.CVE-2026-100307 - Missing authorization on the external management API in mcp-gateway-registry enables privilege escalation to registry administrator
Bulletin ID: 2026-179-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 11/11/2026 12:30 PM PST
Description:
Amazon mcp-gateway-registry is an open-source registry and gateway for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers that centralizes discovery, access control, and proxying of registered MCP tool assets. We identified CVE-2026-100307, a missing-authorization issue in the external management API.
The /api/servers/* management endpoints authenticated the caller but did not perform role-based or permission-based authorization. As a result, an authenticated low-privileged remote user could submit a crafted group import request to POST /api/servers/groups/import that mapped their own identity-provider group to the registry administrator scope. Because administrator status is derived per request, the escalation took effect on the caller's next request with no re-authentication, granting administrative control over every registered gateway asset.
Impacted versions: >= 1.0.9 AND <= 1.24.7
Resolution:
This issue has been addressed in mcp-gateway-registry version 1.25.0 (released 2026-06-27). We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Post-upgrade actions:
Version 1.25.0 enforces authorization on the write path. It does not modify group definitions that were written before the upgrade, and it does not invalidate credentials that were read before the upgrade. A privileged group mapping created through the affected endpoints continues to confer administrator access after the upgrade. Customers who ran an affected version (>= 1.0.9, <= 1.24.7) should complete the following steps after upgrading, using the period during which an affected version was deployed as the review period.
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mcp-registry-admin1.25.0. Upgrading does not remove privileged group mappings created while an affected version ran, so those must be reviewed separately.Workarounds:
The following measures are interim mitigations for deployments that cannot yet upgrade. They limit further unintended access but do not replace the post-upgrade actions above. Until the upgrade is applied, restrict access to the external management API:
References:
Acknowledgement:
We would like to thank the external researcher (handle novice-22) for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated disclosure process.
Please email aws-security@amazon.com with any s ecurity questions or concerns.