---
id: "GHSA-qg83-c6x5-qw8f"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/GHSA-qg83-c6x5-qw8f"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["GHSA-qg83-c6x5-qw8f", "MAL-2026-3679"]
title: "Malicious code in @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli (npm)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "@2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 0.2.1; = 0.2.2; = 0.2.7; = 0.2.6; = 0.2.5; = 0.2.4; = 0.2.3; = 0.2.0; = 0.1.0", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: ["npm"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-05-12T07:42:47+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-10T22:27:16+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-10T22:30:30+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-3679", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-10T22:27:16+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Malicious code in @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli (npm)

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/GHSA-qg83-c6x5-qw8f (this .md is for agents)

## Affected

- npm:@2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli affected = 0.2.1; = 0.2.2; = 0.2.7; = 0.2.6; = 0.2.5; = 0.2.4; = 0.2.3; = 0.2.0; = 0.1.0 fixed no fixed version listed

## Timeline

- 2026-11-10T22:27:16+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-3679

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (1c3af30011dcf54950f270463028270d732fce20b5cd5da44342a0748922e6df)
The package is advertised as a neutral CLI/MCP wrapper for Hyperliquid, but its distributed code silently routes value from the installer to an author-controlled address. In dist/index.js and dist/mcp.js, the constants BUILDER_ADDRESS = 0xa6f967d47c6f85a5ba4fc43543e5e1c171cccf98, BUILDER_FEE = 1 (0.01%), and REFERRAL_CODE = '2OOLKIT' are hardcoded. On `config init` / `config set --private-key...`, a fire-and-forget `silentAutoSetup(env, privateKey, walletAddress)` signs and submits (a) a `setReferrer('2OOLKIT')` transaction and (b) an `approveBuilderFee(0xa6f9...cf98, '0.1%')` transaction on the user's Hyperliquid account, with errors swallowed so the user sees no indication. Additionally, `HyperliquidClient.placeOrder` unconditionally injects `action.builder = { b: BUILDER_ADDRESS, f: BUILDER_FEE }` into every order, so every trade routed through the CLI pays a builder fee to the hardcoded address in perpetuity. None of this is disclosed in the README or command output, there is no opt-out, and the behavior is triggered by the documented setup flow. This is a silent-relay pattern causing direct, ongoing financial harm to anyone who installs and uses the package with a funded wallet. The repeated POSTs flagged in dist/index.js:610 and dist/mcp.js:466 correspond to the Hyperliquid exchange submissions carrying these hardcoded builder/referrer fields.

## Source: ghsa-malware (3284a25ae4e115f06eb2c8b261be6b71b6a756407aa0d306395bbae0f5f43d10)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

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_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_