Live › vulnerability › GHSA-q84f-53jg-9ppm
Go to dashboardThe deviceAuthorization plugin in better-auth 1.3.8-beta.3 through 1.6.x does not show the approving user which client and permissions a device request asks for. An attacker who tricks a signed-in user into approving the attacker's code receives a live Better Auth session token for that user.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-27 14:52 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Only applications that enable the opt-in deviceAuthorization() plugin on an affected version are exposed. The risk is greatest where validateClient is not configured or a valid public client can be used, and where the app accepts the session token the device flow returns. Teams that do not enable the device plugin can skip this.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| better-auth | npm | >= 1.3.8-beta.3, < 1.7.0-rc.3 | 1.7.0-rc.3 |
npm ls better-auth and check whether the installed version is at least 1.3.8-beta.3 and below 1.7.0-rc.3.deviceAuthorization() is enabled in the auth configuration.better-auth to 1.7.0 or later; no 1.6 release contains the fix.GET /device and keep approval disabled until they load.deviceAuthorization() or restrict /device/code access, and tell users to reject unexpected device requests.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
You may be affected if you use better-auth from 1.3.8-beta.3 up to, but not including, 1.7.0-rc.3, and you enable the deviceAuthorization() plugin. This range includes all 1.6 releases.
You are affected only if all of these are also true:
validateClient is not configured, or the attacker can use a valid public client.You are not affected if you do not enable the opt-in deviceAuthorization() plugin.
The device authorization plugin lets a user sign in on one device by approving a short code on another. In affected versions, the approval information given to the user leaves out which client asked for access and which permissions it wants. The official approval examples therefore show only a generic request and a code, so users cannot tell their own device from an attacker's request.
An attacker who convinces a signed-in user to approve the attacker's code receives a live Better Auth session token for that user. The attacker can then read or change any data the user's account can access. The attack needs the opt-in device flow, a request the attacker creates, and a user who actively approves it; it is not a sign-in bypass without user action.
The fix first shipped in 1.7.0-rc.3. Upgrade to [email protected] or later. No 1.6 release contains the fix.
After upgrading, GET /device returns the requesting client_id and scope to the signed-in account that owns the request. If you built your own approval page, update it to show that client and those permissions, and keep approval disabled until they load.
If you cannot upgrade yet, do the following:
deviceAuthorization(), or block untrusted access to /device/code.validateClient allowlist. Do not rely on the allowlist alone: it limits who can start the flow, but it does not give users the missing approval information.A device starts the flow by calling /device/code. The plugin stores the client identifier and any requested scope with the pending request. Before approval, GET /device returns only the user code and its status. This is true even for a signed-in session of the user account that owns the request. An approval page built from that response cannot show which client asked for access or which permissions it wants. After approval, the original device code can be redeemed at /device/token for a Better Auth session token.
RFC 8628 describes this remote phishing scenario. It recommends that the server tell users they are authorizing a device and ask them to confirm that the device is in their possession. It also recommends showing device information that helps users detect impersonation. Client allowlisting reduces who can start the flow, but it does not give users the missing approval information. A valid public client can therefore still be affected when its identifier and requested permissions are not shown.
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