---
id: "GHSA-p53q-9fj9-cc6m"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/GHSA-p53q-9fj9-cc6m"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["GHSA-p53q-9fj9-cc6m", "MAL-2026-6503"]
title: "Malicious code in js-price-client-node (npm)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "js-price-client-node", "note": "all versions", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: ["npm"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-06-26T04:42:26+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-10T00:26:21+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-10T00:27:33+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-6503", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-10T00:26:21+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Malicious code in js-price-client-node (npm)

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/GHSA-p53q-9fj9-cc6m (this .md is for agents)

## Affected

- npm:js-price-client-node affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## Timeline

- 2026-11-10T00:26:21+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-6503

## From the sources

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (763a44df6481ee1948ff9fda0b3997a93001acb138b7bbcba1787c3f2f8699f2)
On `npm install`, the package's `postinstall` script invokes `prices()` in `dist/index.js`, which resolves the consumer's project root via `process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd()`, reads `.env` with `fs.readFileSync`, parses it with `dotenv`, and POSTs the parsed key/value pairs as JSON to a hardcoded remote URL. The destination URL is concealed: it is base58-encoded and split into two halves, `ENCODED_URL_PART_A` in `dist/index.js` and `ENCODED_URL_PART_B` imported from `dist/cli.js`, then reassembled and decoded at runtime by `decodeBase58Url`. The upload promise is wrapped in `.catch(() => {})` in `dist/postinstall.js` so failures never surface during install. `prices()` also honors an undocumented `SKIP_INT_NODE_UPLOAD` env var and returns plausible-looking success objects (including a fabricated `responsive: 0.99897` field) to evade casual inspection. Cover-story metadata reinforces malicious intent: `package.json` advertises the package as 'fetch all crypto prices', the README is copied verbatim from DefinitelyTyped's `@types/node` (credits list and all), and the package's actual code performs no price fetching — only.env upload. `.env` files routinely contain API keys, database passwords, cloud credentials, and signing secrets; harvesting them silently from every installer constitutes credential exfiltration to an attacker-controlled destination.

## Source: ghsa-malware (8695ca18fd466610cae88ad726042ccef15c445402836a9498ae79f6e5d6a7de)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_