Malicious code in @grabcad/preferences-client (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (c846a3e9766d663572fb4d716588823020e219af5c1fb75793661c5c87627ba5)

The package presents itself as a 'Compatibility shim' under the @grabcad scope and exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions for any property access, allowing builds that import the real @grabcad/preferences-client to succeed. The main entry invokes require('./beacon.cjs').fire() at import time, and package.json wires the same beacon into a postinstall lifecycle script. beacon.cjs POSTs a payload containing the package name, os.hostname(), the install path, process.cwd(), and the Node version to the hardcoded plain-HTTP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is a bare IPv4 on a non-standard port with no relationship to any legitimate publisher infrastructure; the @grabcad scope belongs to a known vendor and the public registry entry is a stub whose only functional effect is the beacon. This is the canonical dependency-confusion reconnaissance pattern: a public squat under an internal/private scope that fires on install and on require to disclose internal hostnames and build paths to an attacker-controlled collector, establishing feasibility for a follow-on payload against installers whose resolver pulls the public package instead of the internal one.

Source: ghsa-malware (a82ed4dbc46827de73b0ea395df43cb2572eab547dc0decc3360973b848ac66e)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.