---
id: "GHSA-j7f7-r56m-fxp5"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/GHSA-j7f7-r56m-fxp5"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["GHSA-j7f7-r56m-fxp5", "MAL-2026-17451"]
title: "Malicious code in wailib (npm)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "wailib", "note": "all versions", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: ["npm"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-11-16T18:50:00+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T20:06:47+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T20:10:13+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17451", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T20:06:47+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Malicious code in wailib (npm)

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/GHSA-j7f7-r56m-fxp5 (this .md is for agents)

## Affected

- npm:wailib affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T20:06:47+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17451

## From the sources

This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library (npm) and belongs to the "PhantomSub" family described by OX Security in September 2026: the publisher injected code that, without the installer asking, uses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to subscribe that account to WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) the publisher chose, by sending the WhatsApp `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) for each target channel JID.

`package/lib/Socket/messages-recv.js` lines 45-72 define a char-code decoder (`qvnr`) and use it to build two channel JIDs, `120363428355171197@newsletter` and `120363425751417260@newsletter`, and the method names `newsletterFollow` (`pzha`, cited line 62: `const pzha = qvnr([`) and `newsletterMute` (`wjcf`, line 68), so neither the JIDs nor the method names appear in the source as text. Lines 1125-1140, in the `connection.update` handler, wait 30 seconds after the connection opens and then, for each JID, call `sock[pzha](id)` to follow the channel and, 3 seconds later, `sock[wjcf](id)` to mute it, so the victim is not notified of the channel's posts. There is no opt-out. The README (Portuguese) states "Sem auto-follow de canais — removida a rotina que seguia canais automaticamente apos conectar" ("No channel auto-follow — the routine that followed channels automatically after connecting was removed"), which the shipped code contradicts. The code is derived from `noxleyss` (MAL-2026-17402), whose name it still uses in `package/lib/Utils/generics.js`.

Line numbers refer to version 1.0.0.

Static review of the published tarball(s) found no code that sends WhatsApp credentials or session keys off-host, no install-time payload (the only install hook is Baileys' stock Node.js version check in `engine-requirements.js`), and no persistence; the payload runs when an application creates a WhatsApp socket with the library. The harm is the covert use of the victim's account to inflate the publisher's channel subscribers.

SHA-256 of the published npm tarball(s): 1.0.0: `e762bd70253081e1f523e929509e8bd5ff005feaaec6580f8f8b95ee84085920`.

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: ghsa-malware (a69d8b906240a12db46ebf332e263c3dff74e00da46ea739b18d85780f9205f8)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
