Malicious code in @greenlake/auth (npm)

@greenlake/auth is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (3.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs node beacon.cjs on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (d51386d7bf7b3357a9ea920b99fa08f3c2d37532e877f33a5d8d0a78c12702b5)

The package declares postinstall: node beacon.cjs and additionally fires the same beacon from index.js on require(). The beacon POSTs a JSON payload containing os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), and the Node version to the hardcoded plain-HTTP bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc, which is unrelated to any @greenlake publisher infrastructure. The package otherwise ships no functional code: index.js self-describes as a 'Compatibility shim' and exports a Proxy whose get trap returns a no-op for every property access. The shape — a @scope/<name> no-op shim whose only behavior is identifying the installing host to an attacker-controlled IP on npm install — matches the dependency-confusion probe pattern, where a public package is published under an internal scope name to map which corporate installers resolve to the public registry.

Source: ghsa-malware (e39ad6eeb6fd18f5aeff7b616ce8bfeb8f75d50f2ac28bca24a594dfa83b1510)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.