Malicious code in @grabcad/grabcad-shop-shared (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (8b255034a9e973919c82be7b2f75db934cc8a385c6cb388c6d632769b6ed0889)

The package publishes under the @grabcad scope but provides no real functionality: index.js exports a Proxy stub that no-ops every property access, and the package self-describes as a 'Compatibility shim'. A postinstall hook runs node beacon.cjs, and index.js also invokes the same fire() routine on require. beacon.cjs POSTs a JSON payload containing the package name, os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), and process.version to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over plaintext HTTP. The combination of a scope-matching stub plus install-time and require-time reconnaissance to a non-registry, non-publisher bare-IP destination is the canonical dependency-confusion recon pattern: the stub lets a consumer build succeed silently after accidentally resolving this package instead of an internal @grabcad package, while the beacon discloses the victim's hostname, project path, and runtime to the operator for follow-on targeting.

Source: ghsa-malware (a203fc8f822b4a379a4c171a28188fc39cc94062beac427fc9069aca6df144b7)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.