Malicious code in orderly-plugin-liquidity-heatmap (npm)

orderly-plugin-liquidity-heatmap poses as a liquidity heatmap plugin for the Orderly Network orderbook widget, but its only export is an empty stub and a postinstall hook runs node ./scripts/setup.js on npm install. When the script detects GitHub Actions (CI and GITHUB_WORKSPACE set), it records the runner's host, user, repository, GITHUB_/ACTIONS_/RUNNER_ variable names, GITHUB_TOKEN presence and length and network egress, and requests an OIDC token from ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL. From 1.0.2 it uses the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN to commit heatmap-setup-report.json to the default branch of the installing repository, and 1.0.4 also force-pushes a heatmap-setup-<timestamp> git tag with the credentials actions/checkout persists in .git/config; 1.0.6 ships the same setup.js as 1.0.4. The npm account dumtban published the six versions between 13:12 and 16:05 UTC on 2026-10-11, each extending the previous one's access to the CI runner.

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Source: amazon-inspector (dc82bf27be560cba6faa5304a85b992a07f453c6f9d3f6965f9462666309a3d1)

[email protected] ships a non-functional main (dist/index.js exports registerLiquidityHeatmapPlugin returning an empty function) with no overlay/interceptor/rendering code — the advertised purpose exists only in the README. The sole real behavior is a postinstall script (scripts/setup.js) gated by process.env.CI && process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE, so the payload fires only inside GitHub Actions. On that trigger it collects runner identity (hostname, user, repo, workflow, platform), enumerates all GITHUB_/ACTIONS_/RUNNER_* environment variable names, records GITHUB_TOKEN presence and length, captures the OIDC request URL, the npm registry, egress probe results, and tool versions, and writes the JSON to <GITHUB_WORKSPACE>/heatmap-setup-report.json inside the installer's checked-out repository. In addition, when ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN and ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL are set, it uses the installer's OIDC bearer token to call the GitHub ID-token endpoint with audience=api.github.com and records the mint result in the same report. The combination of a hollow library stub, CI-environment-only activation, enumeration of secrets-adjacent CI metadata, unauthorized exercise of the workflow's OIDC identity, and placement of the output into the repository workspace where subsequent workflow steps may commit it or upload it as an artifact is a CI-poisoning / supply-chain reconnaissance primitive against the installer's build pipeline.

Source: ghsa-malware (f25fe3de75e25d7bb2dee4e8cf02e39d79d011bc22a4b52cf0071bf8a73ad2f2)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.