Live › vulnerability › GHSA-78g4-xqwv-q3g8
Go to dashboardPillow wheels from 11.1.0 through 12.x bundle libopenjp2 2.5.3/2.5.4, which contains a heap-buffer-overflow write in opj_j2k_read_sod reached by Image.open() and im.load() on a crafted JPEG 2000 file. An attacker who can supply an image to an upload or thumbnail path can crash the process and, per the reporter, gain a controlled instruction-pointer primitive that is not a finished exploit.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pillow | pypi | >= 11.1.0, < 13.0.0 | 13.0.0 |
jpg_2000))" and check whether it prints 2.5.3 or 2.5.4 with Pillow between 11.1.0 and 12.x13.0.0 or later, per the advisory's fixed versionEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Every Pillow wheel from 11.1.0 onward bundles a libopenjp2 containing a heap-buffer-overflow write that is fixed upstream on master but has never appeared in an OpenJPEG release. See https://osv.dev/vulnerability/OSV-2025-219
Because the wheel bundles its own copy, a patched host OS does not help. It is reachable from Image.open(fp); im.load() with default settings.
I am reporting it here rather than only upstream because Pillow is where the vulnerable binary actually reaches users.
Note the inversion that makes this easy to miss: OpenJPEG 2.5.2 and earlier are safe. The bug was introduced in 954c6e3c (2024-06-25), so keeping the dependency current is what creates the exposure.
From .github/dependencies.json (openjpeg) at each tag:
| Pillow | bundled OpenJPEG | status |
|---|---|---|
| 10.4.0 | 2.5.2 | safe |
| 11.0.0 | 2.5.2 | safe |
| 11.1.0, 11.2.1, 11.3.0 | 2.5.3 | affected |
| 12.0.0 … 12.3.0 | 2.5.4 | affected |
Confirmed on an installed wheel: PIL.features.version_codec('jpg_2000') → 2.5.4, bundled file pillow.libs/libopenjp2-*.so.2.5.4. main still pins 2.5.4 as of 2026-10-06.
src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c, in opj_j2k_read_sod:
OPJ_UINT32 l_current_tile_part =
l_cstr_index->tile_index[p_j2k->m_current_tile_number].current_tpsno;
l_cstr_index->tile_index[...].tp_index[l_current_tile_part].end_header = l_current_pos;
l_cstr_index->tile_index[...].tp_index[l_current_tile_part].end_pos =
l_current_pos + p_j2k->m_specific_param.m_decoder.m_sot_length + 2;
tp_index is neither null-checked nor bounds-checked, and l_current_tile_part comes directly from the one-byte TPsot field of the SOT marker.
The correct guard already exists a few lines later in opj_j2k_add_tlmarker (j2k.c:8459), writing the same array at the same index behind if (tp_index && l_current_tile_part < nb_tps). One writer checked, its sibling not.
Reached by giving the codestream a valid TLM marker — so tp_index is allocated once by opj_j2k_build_tp_index_from_tlm, sized to the TLM entry count, and opj_j2k_read_sot then skips all resizing — while setting TNsot = 0 in every SOT, which keeps the TLM "valid" and lets TPsot walk past the allocation.
Fixed upstream in 91d08b11 ("Fix heap buffer overlfow in opj_j2k_read_sod", 2026-02-10).
The newest OpenJPEG tag is v2.5.4 (2025-09-20), and compare/v2.5.4...91d08b11 reports ahead 6, behind 0 — the fix is in no release, 8 months on.
91d08b11 as a patch in the wheel build until an OpenJPEG release includes it — three lines, identical to a guard already present in the same file.Image.open() ignores filename/Content-Type and will reach any compiled-in codec unless formats= is passed would help downstream apps a lot.Image.open() sniffs magic bytes, so a JPEG 2000 codestream in a file named avatar.png declared Content-Type: image/png reaches the JP2 decoder anyway.
I verified this against a production service documenting PNG/JPEG-only uploads: it accepted and fully decoded a JP2 through exactly that path, with 16 formats reachable from one upload endpoint against 43 registered openers. That service has since fixed it by passing formats= and validating on the detected format rather than the client's Content-Type.
That is the reason a decoder-level issue like this one has much wider reach than downstream maintainers tend to assume.
ASan build of OpenJPEG 2.5.4 interposed under a stock Pillow 12.3.0, running Image.open(p); im.load():
==766332==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 8
#0 opj_j2k_read_sod j2k.c:5086
#1 opj_j2k_read_tile_header j2k.c:9912
#2 opj_read_tile_header openjpeg.c:575
#3 j2k_decode_entry src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:793
#4 ImagingJpeg2KDecode src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:949
#5 _decode src/decode.c:132
located 8 bytes to the right of a 24-byte region allocated by
opj_j2k_build_tp_index_from_tlm j2k.c:8939
Frames 3–5 are Pillow's own decoder, not a synthetic harness. No non-default decoder options are involved; strict mode is on, which is Pillow's behaviour since Pillow never calls opj_decoder_set_strict_mode. A benign twin image runs the same path cleanly and returns a valid image, so this is the payload and not a parse failure.
I have deliberately not attached the PoC file to this initial report. I'm happy to attach the PoC, the builder script and the RIP-control harness here on request, or hold everything until a fix is ready.
No disclosure deadline from me; I will not publish anything while this is being worked on.
Any application that calls Image.open() / im.load() on an image it did not produce — the overwhelmingly common case for upload handlers, thumbnailers and preview pipelines — can be made to perform an out-of-bounds heap write by supplying one crafted file.
Floor, already certain. On a stock non-sanitised wheel the overflow performs 245 writes walking to +5856 bytes past a 24-byte allocation, and glibc's own heap-metadata checker aborts the process (corrupted size vs. prev_size, corrupted double-linked list, SIGABRT). One file reliably kills a long-lived worker.
Ceiling, demonstrated as a primitive but not as a finished exploit. With same-size-class objects alive on both sides — an ordinary busy heap — the walk crosses opj_event_mgr_t, which holds three opj_msg_callback function pointers, and opj_event_msg then calls one (event.c:136):
rip 0x4000 <- value chosen by the attacker's file layout
rsi 0x3ff2 <- m_error_data, written by the same walk
Shifting the codestream with a COM marker moves rip with it (0x16ce → 0x4000), so the instruction pointer is attacker-chosen rather than incidentally invalid. A benign control image leaves the same groomed heap untouched.
To be explicit about what I did not do: I have not built a working exploit. That additionally needs remote heap grooming and an ASLR defeat, and I attempted neither. I am reporting a controlled control-flow primitive, not a finished chain. The CVSS AC:H reflects that.
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