Live › vulnerability › GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2
Go to dashboardcertifi, the CA bundle used by requests, urllib3 and pip, shipped an emSign root CA whose intermediate keys were compromised and revoked. An attacker holding one of those keys can mint certificates for any hostname and, if also on-path, intercept or modify TLS traffic from clients trusting the bundle.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| certifi | pypi | >= 2019.03.09, < 2026.10.19 | 2026.10.19 |
pip show certifi or python -m certifi to get the installed version, and check whether it is earlier than 2026.10.192026.10.19 or later with pip install --upgrade certifiEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Certifi versions before 2026.10.18 include the emSign ECC Root CA - G3 root certificate in their bundled CA store. Eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates that chain to this root have compromised private keys and the CA has revoked them.
An attacker with one of the compromised keys can issue valid-looking certificates for any hostname. If the attacker is also on-path, they can intercept or modify TLS traffic from clients that trust the certifi bundle. Examples include requests, urllib3 and pip, and the Python.org macOS installer.
Certifi 2026.10.18 removed all emSign roots from the bundle. Certifi 2026.10.19 restored the emSign roots that are not affected. Upgrade to 2026.10.19 or later, and rebuild container images that vendor certifi.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2")
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0. Posts quoted belong to their authors.