Live › vulnerability › GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9
Versions of the pypi-publish GitHub Action before 1.14.2 bundled the emSign root CA certificate through the certifi package, and that CA is part of the chain Sigstore uses for Trusted Publishing and attestations. The advisory describes the risk as revocation of that CA, so trust in releases signed through that chain could be affected.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-30 20:28 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Projects that publish Python packages to PyPI with the pypi-publish action at version 1.14.2 or earlier, using Trusted Publishing or Sigstore attestations. Workflows that do not use this action, or that already pin 1.14.3 or later, are not affected. The advisory does not state the exact impact beyond the CA revocation risk, and the sources do not give an exploit path.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish | github-actions | <= 1.14.2 | 1.14.3 |
pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish pinned below 1.14.2..github/workflows/ for gh-action-pypi-publish.pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish 1.14.3 (affected versions are <= 1.14.2).Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The pypi-publish action versions before 1.14.2 used to bundle the emSign root CA trust store certificate through the certifi distribution. It has since been removed through the bundle and the new version no longer includes them.
The certifi-provided TLS trust store is typically used by many projects in the Python ecosystem, including Sigstore that pypi-publish relies on for Trusted Publishing and Digital Attestations.
The external compromise is being tracked at https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9")
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0. Posts quoted belong to their authors.