Malicious code in @sudobility/wildduck_client (npm)

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Source: amazon-inspector (a4524dc6ef26909f4ddfaf83eae1ec13495a5b2aef57375c0a8d8ad4c0609637)

The package declares a postinstall hook that executes scripts/miner.sh on npm install. The script fetches a gzipped payload from a presigned AWS S3 URL (amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com) using a hardcoded AWSAccessKeyId (<redacted>), writes it to /tmp/.smh, decompresses to /tmp/.smi, and executes it. When root or passwordless sudo is available, it launches sh /tmp/.smi agent with elevated privileges to install a persistent agent (cron plus relay/tor) under stealth system-component process names. Without root, it extracts an embedded base64/tar XMRig binary, writes a mining configuration to ~/.sysmond.json pointing at the pool networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 with a hardcoded wallet, copies the miner to ~/.local/lib/<stealth-name>/<stealth-name>, and launches it via nohup. The package is published under a WildDuck email-client identity that does not correspond to the behavior shipped in the install script.

Source: ghsa-malware (02f525da4c4c8ee5f075a0331435ead2dd17b0ce972b32506ec7dafbf358867b)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.