LINUX-KERNEL · CVE-2026-99306 · Runtime
FIX → 6.18.63
A Ceph monitor can send an MDS map claiming more ranks than the kernel's Ceph client supports, and the client reads past the end of a stack array while checking it. An attacker who can send messages to the monitor connection, which is unauthenticated in legacy messenger mode, can crash the kernel or possibly read adjacent kernel memory.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 3 sources
Check it with your coding agent
It reads this page and tells you if your code or app is affected.
Linux hosts that mount CephFS with the in-kernel client (ceph module), such as Kubernetes nodes using CephFS volumes or servers with mount -t ceph. The malformed MDS map comes from the Ceph monitor connection, which the patch says is unauthenticated in legacy msgr (v1) mode, so a party who can inject or spoof monitor traffic, or a compromised monitor, can trigger an out-of-bounds stack read, with a KASAN report in the patch. Hosts without CephFS kernel mounts, or userspace-only Ceph clients (FUSE, RBD via librbd), can skip it.
Not affected if no-cephfs-mount, userspace-ceph-client
Who cares ceph, cephfs, linux-kernel, self-hosted
Upgrade to 6.18.63
ceph: reject mdsmaps that claim more than CEPH_MAX_MDS ranks: or later on the 6.18 series (its rc1 shortlog lists it)In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: reject mdsmaps that claim more than CEPH_MAX_MDS ranks
check_new_map() sizes its export-target bitmap from CEPH_MAX_MDS but walks it with newmap->possible_max_rank, which comes straight off the wire: ceph_mdsmap_decode() sets it to max(m_num_active_mds, m_max_mds), then overwrites it with the size of the "in" set. Neither is bounded by CEPH_MAX_MDS, only by m_info allocating, so a monitor announcing more ranks than the bitmap holds makes test_bit() read past the end of targets[]. The clear_bit() loop above indexes the same bitmap, though it is additionally bounded by mdsc->max_sessions. The map arrives on the monitor connection, which is unauthenticated in legacy msgr mode.
CEPH_MAX_MDS is a protocol constant from src/mds/mdstypes.h, and the reserved inode ranges in super.h are laid out one rank apart over that span, so a map claiming more ranks is corrupt. Reject it where the rank space is established rather than letting the count reach check_new_map().
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5968) Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000ac7798 by task kworker/1:2/127 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200) check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5968) ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7060) extra_mon_dispatch (fs/ceph/super.c:802) mon_dispatch (net/ceph/mon_client.c:1483) ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424) ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430) ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) </TASK> The buggy address belongs to stack of task kworker/1:2/127 and is located at offset 288 in frame: check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5846) This frame has 1 object: [32, 288) 'targets'
Are you affected?
Ask from here. InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in your inbox.
InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in Slack, with the evidence and the fix.
InfraStack checks it against your stack and answers on your report, with the evidence and the fix.
6.18.63NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain · EPSS scores by FIRST, used with attribution. Posts quoted belong to their authors.