---
id: "CVE-2026-99296"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-99296"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-99296"]
title: "Linux kernel: short Ceph monitor reply lets rbd read stale memory and crash"
severity: "unknown"
cvss: null
epss: 0.00209
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "runtime"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["ceph", "kubernetes", "linux-kernel", "rbd", "runtime"]
not_affected_if: ["no-ceph", "no-rbd"]
published_at: "2026-11-16T10:17:02+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T10:39:26+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T18:53:18+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99296", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T10:39:26+00:00"}, {"source": "epss", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-99296", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T18:53:18+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: [{"type": "epss", "score": 0.00209, "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-99296"}]
---

# Linux kernel: short Ceph monitor reply lets rbd read stale memory and crash

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-99296 (this .md is for agents)

A short Ceph monitor command reply is decoded past the bytes actually received, so the kernel reads uninitialized or attacker-chosen memory. Writing to the rbd add sysfs file can then pass that bad value to ERR_PTR() and fault the kernel.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T10:39:26+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99296
- 2026-11-16T18:53:18+00:00 epss https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-99296

## From the sources

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: bound mon_command ack decode to front len

handle_command_ack() bounds the decode with msg->front_alloc_len, the size
of the reply buffer, instead of msg->front.iov_len, the number of bytes the
monitor sent.  mon_alloc_msg() routes every CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK to
get_generic_reply(), which returns the preallocated ->reply of whichever
generic request carries the same tid, so the buffer keeps its fixed size
however short the reply is.  An ack with hdr.front_len below sizeof(struct
ceph_mon_request_header) + sizeof(u32), including 0, still passes
ceph_decode_need(), and ceph_decode_32() returns four bytes that were never
received: uninitialized slab memory, stale bytes of an earlier message, or
bytes the peer planted by sending a reply that lands in the same buffer and
is then rejected.  The read stays within the allocation, so KASAN does not
flag it.

req->result reaches userspace through ceph_monc_do_statfs(),
ceph_monc_get_version() and ceph_monc_blocklist_add(); rbd hands it back
from write() on /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major, and rbd_get_client() passes
it to ERR_PTR() unchecked, which faults:

  rbd: failed to get latest osdmap: -186318427
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfffe9ca034
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7105)
  Call Trace:
   ...
   kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:345)
   vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687)
   ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Use msg->front.iov_len, matching handle_subscribe_ack(),
handle_statfs_reply(), handle_get_version_reply() and handle_auth_reply().
A well-formed ack has front.iov_len >= 22 and is unaffected; a short one
takes the existing bad: path.  This applies commit d3c32939fa0e ("libceph:
bound get_version reply decode to front len") to the last decode-side
use of front_alloc_len in this file.

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