---
id: "CVE-2026-99223"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-99223"]
title: "Linux kernel: keyring order leaks kernel addresses, weakening KASLR"
severity: "low"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "runtime"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["linux-kernel", "multi-user-systems", "runtime", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["single-user-machines"]
published_at: "2026-11-02T16:17:46+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-02T16:24:05+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-02T16:26:58+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99223", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-02T16:24:05+00:00"}]
---

# Linux kernel: keyring order leaks kernel addresses, weakening KASLR

The Linux kernel's keyring index ordering depended on kernel memory addresses, so the order returned by KEYCTL_READ could reveal the kernel's randomized load address. An unprivileged local user could use this to defeat KASLR, making other kernel exploits easier.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Timeline

- 2026-11-02T16:24:05+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99223

## From the sources

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses

KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array
traversal order.  The first word of the index is a public, deterministic
hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description.  An unprivileged
user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their
order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address.
On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to
distinguish the candidate slides.

Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word.
Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and
the description with a once-initialized SipHash key.  Use the full IDs in
the later index chunks as well.  Truncating or hashing the IDs there would
lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a
differing index bit.

Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered.  Cache
them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not
need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered.
Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent,
and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search.
The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged;
only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced.

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_