Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-99170
Go to dashboardA locked mount of a mount namespace file can be moved beneath another locked mount, so a local user in its own user namespace can remove the cover over a file and read content that should stay hidden. The kernel now refuses to copy such mounts and refuses to move them beneath locked mounts.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-28 11:32 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Systems running a Linux kernel without this fix where unprivileged local users can create user and mount namespaces; the sources do not name specific distributions or kernel versions. Systems that disable unprivileged user namespaces are likely not exposed, but the sources do not confirm this.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: a mount that copy_tree() leaves out can't take over a lock
Since commit c62a4766937e ("move_mount: transfer MNT_LOCKED") a mount can be moved beneath a locked mount. The lock moves from the old cover to the new mount which takes over the job of hiding what's under it and the old cover can be unmounted. That works as long as the new mount stays. But the caller picks the new mount and copy_tree() leaves a mount of a mount namespace file out of every copy made without CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE, together with everything mounted on it, and never looks at MNT_LOCKED. unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and mount propagation make such copies.
So a task that is root in its own user namespace gets rid of a locked cover on a file without a race and without touching the filesystem below it. It makes a child with a mount namespace of its own, binds the child's /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt beneath the cover with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH, which hands the lock to that bind, and calls unshare(CLONE_NEWNS). The new mount namespace has nothing on the file. That's the usual way to mask a single file, a bind of /dev/null or of an empty file. With a bind of an ordinary file the file stays covered.
copy_tree() already refuses to leave out a locked unbindable mount with -EPERM since commit df7342b24018 ("mount: Don't allow copying MNT_UNBINDABLE|MNT_LOCKED mounts"). Do the same for a locked mount of a mount namespace file. That also covers a tree copied with CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE and attached into a mount namespace of another user namespace where lock_mnt_tree() locks it. Note that unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) and clone(CLONE_NEWNS) fail with EPERM from such a mount namespace from then on. The mount can't be left out and it can't be unmounted.
And refuse to move a mount of a mount namespace file beneath a locked mount in the first place. Otherwise the task ends up with a mount it can't unmount and an unshare() that fails for good.
Chris also found a second mount that goes away by itself, a clone of an automounted mount that shrink_submounts() took along with its parent. Commit f78ddcc87224 ("namespace: never expire a locked mount") took care of that one.
Chris's reproducer is appended. Mode nsfile reads SECRET after the unshare() on 7.3-rc7, with this patch the move_mount() fails with EINVAL and the file stays covered. nsfile-control uses an ordinary file and reads MASK both ways.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /*
W/D file, holds SECRET, covered by a bind of a file with MASK
W/Dd/inner file, holds SECRET, Dd is covered by a bind of a directory
whose "inner" holds MASK
W/own directory of uid 1000 with the file "mine" and the
directory "minedir", whose "inner" holds MINE
W/dbg debugfs, mode 755. dbg/tracing is an automount point
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cover of D, then unshare(CLONE_NEWNS)
unmount the cover, put a tmpfs beneath W, call umount(W), which fails