Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-98977
Go to dashboardWhen mounts propagate across user namespaces, the kernel can lock the wrong copy of an automounted mount, so a host mount can no longer have its flags changed. The sources describe a local reproducer, but do not state a confirmed privilege escalation or data exposure.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Systems running a Linux kernel that includes the affected mount code, especially hosts that use user namespaces with propagated mounts such as debugfs or tracefs automounts. Hosts that do not use user namespaces or shared mount propagation are less likely to be exposed. The sources do not say more.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
uname -r and compare against the fixed kernel version in your distribution's advisoryEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly
If mounts are propagated across user namespaces, attach_recursive_mnt() locks every copy of the source mount to protect overmounts from vanishing and revealing the underlying files or directories.
The user namespace is taken from the caller's mount namespaces since this is where the mounts end up. Except, that's not always true. Automounts may legitimately get popped in by tasks located in a different mount and user namespace during path lookup.
Then check doesn't make sense at that point. The copy in the namespace of the parent - which may be the host's - is now locked and the host cannot change the flags of its own mounts anymore.
Here's the reproducer:
host has debugfs mounted nosuid,nodev,noexec and shared
tracefs automount below it is not yet active
hand a child process a directory descriptor on that mount
child process enters auser and mount namespace
child process' namespace now holds a locked copy of the host's debugfs mount that receives propagation from it
child process stats "tracing/." through the descriptor
lookup runs on the host's mount so the automount lands below the host's mount
propagation puts a copy below the child's copy
both try to clear the flags on the mount they got, with a bind remount:
host, on its own automount: MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = EPERM child, on the copy in its namespace: MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = 0
So the lock landed on the host's mount instead of the child's copy. Congrats. So we need to compare with the owner of the namespace the mount actually gets mounted on. For all regular cases that is the caller's mount namespace and so nothing changes.
Detached trees in anonymous mount namespaces by be handed over via SCM_RIGHTS or inherited in other ways on purpose so the attaching task's mount namespace is authoritative, not the creator of the detached tree.
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