Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-98976
Go to dashboardIn the Linux kernel, mount propagation can unlock a locked mount covering a directory, so a user namespace owner can unmount the cover and read files underneath, such as a secret in P/d. The fix keeps the lock on the mount beneath a propagated copy so the cover stays locked.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Systems that run Linux kernels with user namespaces and shared mount propagation, where a host mounts or unmounts filesystems that propagate into unprivileged user namespaces. Kernel versions and patched releases are not stated in the sources. Systems without user namespaces or without shared mount propagation are likely not exposed, but the sources do not confirm this.
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Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath
attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted.
Consider two mount namespaces:
(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d.
Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.
Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:
Z: umount2(P/d) = EINVAL /* the cover is locked */
H: mount X on P/d, umount X /* both propagate into Z /*
Z: umount2(P/d) = 0 /* the cover is now unlocked */
Z: read P/d/secret = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */
So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is unmounted again.
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