Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-98853
Go to dashboardThe Linux kernel's generic segmentation offload path re-entered the IPv4 and IPv6 segmentation handlers once per nested IP header without a depth limit, so a deeply nested packet can exhaust the kernel stack. The fix caps handler entries at the existing tunnel recursion limit and returns an error beyond it.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Systems running a Linux kernel with IP-in-IP tunnels and GSO/TSO segmentation enabled are the ones where the nested path is reachable, per the description. Hosts with no IP-in-IP tunnel traffic and kernels without the stackable IPv4 and IPv6 GSO path are likely less exposed, but the sources do not spell this out.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
Unknown from the sources.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation
IP-in-IP GSO can re-enter inet_gso_segment() or ipv6_gso_segment() for each nested IP header. encap_level tracks header bytes, not callback depth, so a deep chain can exhaust the kernel stack. Making inet_gso_segment() stackable introduced unbounded IPv4 nesting; IPIP GSO/TSO later made the path reachable. The IPv6 stackable path was introduced separately and uses the same guard.
Count IPv4 and IPv6 GSO handler entries in skb_gso_cb, initialized once per top-level GSO operation and preserved across GRE/UDP context changes. Use the existing IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT for both handlers. The first five entries pass, and the sixth returns -EINVAL before dispatching another GSO callback.
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