Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-98799
Go to dashboardWhen a BPF program is detached from a trampoline while another sleeping program in the same trampoline image is still running, the kernel can free the detached program too early and then call it, causing a kernel oops (int3 on x86). The sources describe a crash in a production kernel and a KASAN-found bug; they do not state a confirmed privilege escalation.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Linux systems running a kernel that includes this BPF trampoline change, where BPF programs (fentry/fexit/LSM) are attached and detached at runtime. Hosts that do not use BPF trampolines, or run kernels without this fix, should check their kernel version against their distribution's advisory. The sources do not give affected kernel version ranges.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
Unknown from the sources.
Unknown from the sources.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip detached progs in trampoline images that are still in use
bpf_tramp_image_put() makes sure a trampoline image is not freed while a task may still be running in it, but nothing similar is done for the progs called by that image. Detach drops the last prog reference right away and the prog is freed after grace periods, on the basis that a task still in the traced function skips the fexit progs once the nop at ip_after_call is patched to a jump.
That leaves out a task sleeping in a sleepable prog that runs before the detached one, which no grace period waits for:
CPU 0 CPU 1 in image I, sleeping in prog S detach P from I's trampoline -> new image, bpf_tramp_image_put(I) bpf_prog_put(P), last ref grace periods, P freed back from S __bpf_prog_enter(P) call P->bpf_func
If S and P are fexit progs the task is already past the patched jump, and fentry only images don't have one. On x86 this is an int3 in poisoned bpf_prog_pack memory:
Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 18 UID: 0 PID: 94573 Comm: x169 Not tainted 6.18.44 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0601d8d Call Trace: <TASK> ? bpf_trampoline_6442515411+0x1a4/0x21b bpf_lsm_bprm_committed_creds+0x5/0x10 security_bprm_committed_creds+0x5f/0x70 begin_new_exec+0x2d6/0x410 ...
We hit this in production when progs attached through trampolines got detached while their hooks were busy, and it was independently found with a fuzzer and KASAN.
Have the JITs emit a patchable nop in front of each prog call sequence and record it in the image. When a prog is detached, patch its nop to a jump over the call sequence. Progs that stay attached keep running for the tasks that are in the image, and ip_after_call isn't needed anymore.
The task can be in any image that isn't freed yet, not only in the current one. It sleeps in image I1 that calls S, P and Q, then P is detached and the trampoline moves to image I2, then Q is detached and its call is still in I1. So the trampoline keeps a list of its images until they are freed, and detaching a prog patches its nop in all of them. Images hold a reference on the trampoline for that long.
On riscv and loongarch a jump of any range takes several instructions, and a task preempted in the middle of them could resume into half of the new sequence. The nop is a single instruction there, patched to a near branch through arch_bpf_trampoline_skip().
With the extra nops, BPF_MAX_TRAMP_LINKS progs no longer fit in a page on x86 and arm64 (and already didn't on powerpc), so lower the limit there like s390 does.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-98799")
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