---
id: "CVE-2026-98759"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-98759"]
title: "Linux kernel: USB Type-C TPS6598x driver leaves stack data uninitialized"
severity: "unknown"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["embedded", "infrastructure", "laptops", "linux-kernel", "usb-typec"]
not_affected_if: ["driver-not-loaded", "no-tipd-hardware"]
published_at: "2026-10-18T16:17:29+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:16+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T05:16:48+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98759", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:16+00:00"}]
---

# Linux kernel: USB Type-C TPS6598x driver leaves stack data uninitialized

The Linux kernel's USB Type-C tipd (cd321x) driver registers a port partner using a stack structure whose callback and field values were never set. Stale stack contents can become function pointers invoked when a USB device attaches, which can lead to kernel memory corruption or code execution.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- unknown

## Fix

- Update to a Linux kernel release containing the upstream commit that zero-initializes typec_partner_desc in cd321x_update_work(); the sources do not name the fixed version.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:16+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98759

## From the sources

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: typec: tipd: fix uninitialized typec_partner_desc in cd321x_update_work()

cd321x_update_work() passes a stack-allocated typec_partner_desc to
typec_register_partner() after initializing only usb_pd, accessory and
identity.

typec_register_partner() copies attach and deattach from the descriptor
into the partner. With those fields left unset, garbage function pointers
may be stored and later invoked from typec_partner_link_device() when a USB
device is linked to the port. Uninitialized pd_revision and usb_capability
similarly leak stack data through partner sysfs.

Zero-initialize the descriptor so optional callbacks remain NULL and the
remaining fields are zero.

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_