Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-98627
Go to dashboardThe Linux kernel BPF verifier fails to preserve pointer displacement between registers sharing a packet pointer ID during state pruning. A crafted BPF program could then perform an out-of-bounds packet memory access.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Systems running a Linux kernel with the eBPF verifier, especially hosts that let untrusted users load BPF programs. The sources do not name specific distributions or kernel versions, so this is unknown beyond kernels containing the referenced commit 022ac0750883 or later. Hosts where BPF loading is restricted to trusted root users carry less risk.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
uname -r and compare against the fixed kernel versions in the NVD entrysysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabledEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve packet pointer class displacement in regsafe()
regsafe() maps packet pointer IDs between states and checks that each current register range is a subset of the corresponding explored register range. It does not, however, preserve the displacement between registers that share a packet pointer ID.
This is unsound because packet range is shared by ID. A bounds check on one class member updates every member, and a later access can consume the range through another member. Commit 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers") folded the fixed pointer offset into r64 and removed the old off equality check, so two individually narrower registers can prune even when their displacement has changed. The explored path can then license an out-of-bounds packet access on the pruned path.
Require matching range bases for packet pointers with an ID. Together with the existing ID mapping, this preserves the displacement between members of each packet-pointer class without adding per-ID state. Packet pointers without an ID remain unaffected.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-98627")
NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.