Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-98612
Go to dashboardA crafted USB packet header makes the Linux kernel's catc network driver copy data past the end of its receive buffer, and accepts undersized frames that lead to reads of uninitialised memory. The sources do not state whether this allows code execution or only crashes and information leaks.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Only systems that load the catc USB network driver, which supports CATC USB-to-Ethernet adapters, are exposed. Machines without these adapters, and kernels built without the driver, can skip it. The sources do not say whether an attacker needs physical access to plug in a device or can trigger this remotely.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
catc driver is loaded with lsmod | grep catc or built in with grep CONFIG_USB_NET_CDCETHER /boot/config-$(uname -r) (the catc driver is CONFIG_USB_CATC)uname -r against the fixed kernel release listed in the upstream stable tree (unknown in the sources)echo 'blacklist catc' > /etc/modprobe.d/catc.confEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()
catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer.
A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path.
Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an Ethernet header.
A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one, previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-98612")
NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.