---
id: "CVE-2026-98550"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-98550"]
title: "Linux kernel TIPC: stale group ACK can wrap counter and block broadcasts"
severity: "unknown"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["kernel", "linux", "package", "tipc"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-10-18T16:17:07+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:15+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T05:23:31+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98550", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:15+00:00"}]
---

# Linux kernel TIPC: stale group ACK can wrap counter and block broadcasts

A flaw in the Linux kernel's TIPC group messaging accepts unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG packets, which can decrement a 16-bit acknowledgement counter below zero. The counter then wraps and makes the socket report permanent congestion, blocking future group broadcasts.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:15+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98550

## From the sources

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow

Commit 48a5fe38772b ("tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m->bc_acked).

However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:

1. When grp->bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
   ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
   acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked > m->bc_acked
   passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp->bc_ackers.
   Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
   tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
   all future group broadcasts on the socket.

2. During an active broadcast round (grp->bc_ackers > 0), the sender
   transmits packet S and advances grp->bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
   increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
   so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
   acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt.

   However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member's
   m->bc_acked to prev = grp->bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
   This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
   An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
   prevented from decrementing grp->bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale
   value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed
   by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp->bc_ackers twice in the same
   round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it.

Fix this by:
- Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp->bc_ackers is zero.
- Requiring acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where
  m->bc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly
  sequential, only grp->bc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member
  can acknowledge at most once per round.

Note that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member()
(where grp->bc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does
not restore *grp->open or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed
in a separate patch.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_