---
id: "CVE-2026-98468"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-98468"]
title: "Linux kernel: KVM arm64 spurious warning during stage 2 teardown race"
severity: "low"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "runtime"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["arm64", "kvm", "linux-kernel", "runtime", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["no-kvm", "x86-only-hosts"]
published_at: "2026-10-18T16:16:57+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:15+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T05:27:09+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98468", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:15+00:00"}]
---

# Linux kernel: KVM arm64 spurious warning during stage 2 teardown race

A race between memory migration and KVM stage 2 page table teardown on arm64 triggers a kernel WARN_ON, but the race is handled correctly. The sources describe a spurious warning, not memory corruption or code execution.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- unknown

## Fix

- unknown

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:15+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98468

## From the sources

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: arm64: Fix spurious warning for benign stage 2 teardown race

kvmtool was used to establish an L1 guest with 8 CPUs and 8 GiB of RAM, an
L2 guest with 4 CPUs and 4 GiB of RAM and an L3 guest with 2 CPUs and 2 GiB
of RAM, all of which was then exited.

Under memory pressure in the L0 host warnings were observed due to
migration triggered by compaction:

WARNING: arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c:336 at __unmap_stage2_range+0x64/0x80,
CPU#5: kcompactd0/66

Which was, in turn, triggered by an MMU notifier for the host invalidation:

mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start()
  -> ... -> kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start()
    -> kvm_mmu_unmap_gfn_range()
      -> kvm_unmap_gfn_range()
        -> kvm_nested_s2_unmap()
          -> kvm_stage2_unmap_range()
            -> __unmap_stage2_range()
               -> stage2_apply_range()
       	       <- -EINVAL, triggering a WARN_ON()

Racing with L0's teardown of stage 2 page tables:

exit_mm()
  -> mmput()
    -> __mmput()
      -> exit_mmap()
        -> mmu_notifier_release()
	  -> ... -> kvm_mmu_notifier_release()
            -> kvm_flush_shadow_all()
              -> kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all()
	        -> kvm_free_stage2_pgd()
		  -> [ acquire kvm->mmu_lock for write ]
		  -> mmu->pgt = NULL [ among other tasks ]
		  -> [ release kvm->mmu_lock for write ]

It turns out there is a benign race resulting in a spurious warning:

	Thread A - notify: migration   | Thread B - notify: release
	-------------------------------|---------------------------------
	< kvm->mmu_lock held >         |
	stage2_apply_range()           |
	  get mmu->pgt, check !NULL    |
	  ...                          | kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all()
	  cond_resched_rwlock_write(); |   < contend, sleep kvm->mmu_lock >
	< drop kvm->mmu_lock >         |   < acquire kvm->mmu_lock>
                                       |   ...
				       |   kvm_free_stage2_pgd()
                                       |     mmu->pgt = NULL
				       |   < invalidate MMU >
				       |   ...
				       |   < release kvm->mmu_lock >
	[ scheduled ]		       |
	stage2_apply_range()           |
	  < loop to next >             |
	  get, mmu->pgt, check !NULL   |
	  is NULL, return -EINVAL      |
        __unmap_stage2_range()         |
	  WARN_ON(-EINVAL) <--- entirely spurious - the race was handled
                                 correctly.

Fix the spurious warning by updating stage2_apply_range() to no longer
treat concurrent PGT teardown on lock release as an error - whether the
walker is tearing down page tables or doing something else this is a
legitimate reason to abort the operation without error.

This keeps the warning in place for all other circumstances.

In practice only __unmap_stage2_range() actually does anything with the
error so this only impacts that.

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_