{"id":"CVE-2026-97373","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-97373"],"related":[],"title":"draw.io: proxy endpoint lets attackers reach internal addresses via SSRF","description":"draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to 30.3.8, the optional /proxy endpoint contains an incomplete server-side request forgery blocklist. When the endpoint is enabled, the URL validator does not reject the RFC 6598 shared address range 100.64.0.0/10. An unauthenticated remote attacker can cause the draw.io server to request internal services that are reachable in this range, potentially disclosing data from Carrier-Grade NAT, Kubernetes, cloud, or overlay-network addresses. This vulnerability is fixed in 30.3.8.","summary":"draw.io, a diagramming application, has an optional /proxy endpoint whose URL check misses the RFC 6598 shared address range 100.64.0.0/10. An unauthenticated remote attacker can make the draw.io server request internal services in that range and may read the responses.","severity":"medium","cvss":5.8,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["draw.io","kubernetes","package","self-hosted"],"not_affected_if":["managed-hosting","proxy-endpoint-disabled"],"how_to_check":null,"fix":"- Move draw.io to `30.3.8` or later.","status":"open","published_at":"2026-11-04T21:18:17+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-04T21:49:23+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-04T21:51:22+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-04T21:51:22+00:00","category":"package","confidence":0.7,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-04T21:51:22Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- Move draw.io to `30.3.8` or later.","reach":"internet","title":"draw.io: proxy endpoint lets attackers reach internal addresses via SSRF","impact":"medium","summary":"draw.io, a diagramming application, has an optional /proxy endpoint whose URL check misses the RFC 6598 shared address range 100.64.0.0/10. An unauthenticated remote attacker can make the draw.io server request internal services in that range and may read the responses.","audience":"businesses","category":"package","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["draw.io","self-hosted","kubernetes"],"confidence":0.7,"fix_status":"available","needs_auth":"no","worst_case":"internal services in shared address range readable by remote attacker","analyst_note":"","how_to_check":"- Check the draw.io version the server runs; `30.3.7` or earlier is affected per the sources.\n- Check whether the `/proxy` endpoint is enabled in the deployment configuration (unknown which setting the sources name).","plain_action":"","needs_analyst":false,"not_affected_if":["proxy-endpoint-disabled","managed-hosting"],"who_is_affected":"Only deployments where the optional /proxy endpoint is enabled are exposed, since the URL validator is the flawed part. The sources say the attacker reaches services in 100.64.0.0/10 from the draw.io server, so self-hosted instances on networks with Carrier-Grade NAT, Kubernetes or overlay addresses are the ones to look at. Instances without the proxy endpoint enabled can skip it.","user_interaction":"no","needs_special_setup":"yes","severity_if_unknown":"medium"},"cost_usd":0.000713,"input_tokens":4238,"output_tokens":579,"severity_before":"medium"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-2026':12A,15A '-97373':13A,16A '/10':43B,106C '/proxy':30B,77C '100.64.0.0':42B,105C '30.3.8':74C,146C '6598':38B,101C 'address':8A,40B,103C,140C 'applic':26B,71C 'attack':5A,47B,110C 'blocklist':87C 'carrier':131C 'carrier-grad':130C 'caus':112C 'check':34B 'cloud':135C 'configur':67C 'contain':79C 'cve':11A,14A 'data':128C 'diagram':25B,68C 'disclos':127C 'draw.io':1A,17B,23B,51B,64C,114C 'enabl':92C 'endpoint':3A,31B,78C,90C 'fix':144C 'forgeri':86C 'grade':132C 'host':22B 'incomplet':81C 'intern':7A,54B,118C 'kubernet':18B,134C 'let':4A 'make':49B 'may':60B 'miss':35B 'nat':133C 'network':139C 'option':29B,76C 'overlay':138C 'overlay-network':137C 'packag':19B 'potenti':126C 'prior':72C 'proxi':2A 'rang':41B,58B,104C,125C 'reach':6A 'reachabl':122C 'read':61B 'reject':98C 'remot':46B,109C 'request':53B,85C,117C 'respons':63B 'rfc':37B,100C 'self':21B 'self-host':20B 'server':52B,83C,115C 'server-sid':82C 'servic':55B,119C 'share':39B,102C 'side':84C 'ssrf':10A 'unauthent':45B,108C 'url':33B,94C 'valid':95C 'via':9A 'vulner':142C 'whiteboard':70C 'whose':32B","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Only deployments where the optional /proxy endpoint is enabled are exposed, since the URL validator is the flawed part. The sources say the attacker reaches services in 100.64.0.0/10 from the draw.io server, so self-hosted instances on networks with Carrier-Grade NAT, Kubernetes or overlay addresses are the ones to look at. Instances without the proxy endpoint enabled can skip it.","tier":"C","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"available","audience":"businesses","plain_action":null,"pkeys":[],"ptokens":[],"labels":["drawio","kubernetes","medium","package","selfhosted"],"campaign_type":null,"first_public_at":"2026-07-14T08:12:52+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","cvss_by":"security-advisories@github.com","poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-97373","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97373","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-04T21:18:17+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-04T21:18:17+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-04T21:49:23+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-04T21:49:23+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[{"id":70712,"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/commit/73c4a91196246bbdb60f52b15871e82006b7972d","title":"Patch: github.com","kind":"other","source":"nvd","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":null,"relation":"fix","confidence":null,"note":"Patch: github.com"},{"id":70713,"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/security/advisories/GHSA-xc39-mcq4-fr4q","title":"Vendor advisory: github.com","kind":"vendor","source":"nvd","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":"2026-07-14T08:12:52+00:00","relation":"advisory","confidence":null,"note":"Vendor advisory: github.com"}],"exploit_sources":[],"notice":"Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai"}