Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-94384
Go to dashboardThe sfExecuteAWSService Lambda function in Amazon Connect Salesforce Lambda, used during initial setup, passes caller-supplied parameters to privileged AWS APIs without checking authorization. Any IAM principal with lambda:InvokeFunction on that function can perform AWS operations their own IAM permissions would deny.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-24 19:43 UTC, 1h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams that deployed Amazon Connect Salesforce Lambda from the Serverless Application Repository with versions 5.15 through 5.24.16 are exposed, as long as the sfExecuteAWSService function remains in the account. Exposure depends on which IAM principals can invoke that function, so accounts that already restrict invocation to the CTI Adapter user are at lower risk. Teams on 5.26 or later, or that deleted the function after setup, can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
>= 5.15 and <= 5.24.16sfExecuteAWSService function still exists in the account and who holds lambda:InvokeFunction on itSalesforceExecuteAWSServiceUser parameter is set5.26 or latersfExecuteAWSService function after setup is completelambda:InvokeFunction only to the CTI Adapter's IAM user and set SalesforceExecuteAWSServiceUser to that same user; optionally deny it to all other principals with a service control policy or permission boundaryEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
CVE-2026-94384 - Missing Authorization in AmazonConnectSalesforceLambda sfExecuteAWSService
Bulletin ID: 2026-115-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 09/22/2026 10:00 AM PDT
Description:
Amazon Connect Salesforce Lambda (AmazonConnectSalesforceLambda) is a Serverless Application Repository application that provides Lambda functions for integrating Amazon Connect with Salesforce. We identified CVE-2026-94384, a missing authorization issue in the sfExecuteAWSService Lambda function, which is used only during initial setup. The function dispatches caller-supplied parameters to privileged AWS service APIs without validating the caller's authorization. As a result, an IAM principal with lambda:InvokeFunction permission on the function can perform AWS operations that their own IAM permissions would otherwise deny.
Impacted versions: >= 5.15 AND <= 5.24.16
Resolution:
To remediate this issue, upgrade to AmazonConnectSalesforceLambda version 5.26 or later. After setup is complete, either delete or disable the sfExecuteAWSService function. If you keep the function, restrict who can invoke it: within your account, grant lambda:InvokeFunction on the function only to the single IAM user the CTI Adapter uses to call it and to no other principal (for stronger enforcement, deny it for all other principals using a service control policy or permission boundary); and set the SalesforceExecuteAWSServiceUser parameter to that same IAM user so that cross-account invocation is limited to it.
Verification:
Confirm the sfExecuteAWSService function has been deleted or disabled after setup. If you keep the function, confirm that within your account lambda:InvokeFunction on the function is granted only to the CTI Adapter's IAM user, and that the SalesforceExecuteAWSServiceUser parameter names that same user.
References:
Acknowledgement:
We would like to thank Chang Li of Xidian University for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
Please email [email protected] with any security questions or concerns.
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