Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-93757
The Wild Apricot Login WordPress plugin, up to and including 1.0.18, matches an incoming SSO login to an existing WordPress user by email address without proving the person owns that account. An attacker who controls a Wild Apricot contact with the same email as a site administrator gets a network-wide login cookie for that administrator.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-29 04:41 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Sites running Wild Apricot Login up to and including 1.0.18 with SSO enabled, most seriously WordPress Multisite networks where the cookie is valid across subsites. Exploitation needs a Wild Apricot contact whose email matches a WordPress administrator, which a public zero-fee membership application can create. Single-site installs without the plugin active can skip this.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
1.0.18 are affected.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
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