---
id: "CVE-2026-93667"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-93667"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-93667"]
title: "Zephyr: VLAN frame on a down interface triggers a mistyped indirect call"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 5.9
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "runtime"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["embedded", "network-stack", "runtime", "vlan", "zephyr"]
not_affected_if: ["no-virtual-l2", "no-vlan-interfaces"]
published_at: "2026-11-16T22:18:26+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T22:39:15+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T22:41:01+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93667", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T22:39:15+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Zephyr: VLAN frame on a down interface triggers a mistyped indirect call

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-93667 (this .md is for agents)

Zephyr's virtual L2 receive handler falls through to an indirect call on the wrong structure when a tagged Ethernet frame arrives for a VLAN interface that is down. The call reads driver-side function pointers from the wrong type, leading to memory corruption and crashes in the network receive path.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check whether the device runs Zephyr with the Virtual L2 / VLAN networking layer enabled (`subsys/net/l2/virtual`, VLAN interfaces configured).
- Check the Zephyr version against the fixed release (unknown from the sources).
- Check whether `CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET` is enabled, which changes which driver slot is read.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T22:39:15+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93667

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-5q52-q965-fwp8
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/226e821d8587aaae955b9682234b0b44722c8a4e

## From the sources

The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled).

The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.

The resulting call passes a struct net_if  where the driver expects a struct device  and a struct net_pkt  where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.

The same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.

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_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
