---
id: "CVE-2026-92171"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-92171"]
title: "Infinispan Operator: xsite TLS passwords exposed in Gossip Router pod arguments"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 6.5
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["infinispan", "infrastructure", "kubernetes", "openshift", "red-hat-data-grid"]
not_affected_if: ["no-cross-site-replication", "xsite-tls-disabled"]
published_at: "2026-10-26T15:16:45+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T16:02:26+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T16:03:50+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92171", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T16:02:26+00:00"}]
---

# Infinispan Operator: xsite TLS passwords exposed in Gossip Router pod arguments

When cross-site TLS is enabled, the Infinispan Operator starts the Gossip Router container with keystore and truststore passwords as plain command-line arguments. Anyone who can read pod specs in the namespace, or local processes on the node, can capture those passwords without needing access to secrets.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check whether cross-site TLS is enabled in the Infinispan custom resources (look for xsite TLS settings in the Infinispan spec).
- Inspect the Gossip Router pod with `kubectl get pod <pod> -o yaml` and look for `-tls_keystore_password` or `-tls_truststore_password` in the container args.
- Review who holds `get pods` permission in the namespace.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T16:02:26+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92171

## From the sources

A flaw was found in the Infinispan Operator for Red Hat Data Grid. When cross-site (xsite) TLS is enabled, the operator launches the Gossip Router container with keystore and truststore passwords passed as plain-text command-line arguments (`-tls_keystore_password`, `-tls_truststore_password`). Container args are stored in the Pod spec and visible to any principal with `get pods` permission in the namespace (no `get secrets` required), to node-level processes via `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, and frequently captured in audit/event logs.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_