---
id: "CVE-2026-89332"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-89332"]
title: "Kiro IDE: agent-written workspace settings leak project data to outside URL"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 6.7
epss: 0.00179
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "ai-tooling"
products: [{"name": "amazon kiro ide", "fixed": ["0.8.135"], "affected": "< 0.8.135", "ecosystem": "vendor"}]
ecosystems: ["vendor"]
tags: ["ai-agents", "ai-tooling", "aws", "developer-workstations", "kiro-ide", "lab-disclosure"]
not_affected_if: ["no-kiro-ide", "version-0.8.135-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-09-11T20:19:23+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-24T18:43:45+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T12:38:49+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "lab", "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/2026-111-aws/", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-24T18:43:45+00:00"}, {"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89332", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-24T18:53:56+00:00"}, {"source": "epss", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-89332", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-25T12:38:49+00:00"}]
---

# Kiro IDE: agent-written workspace settings leak project data to outside URL

A specially crafted repository can make the Kiro agent write a workspace settings file that points the Powers registry URL at an external endpoint. When the Powers panel is opened, Kiro sends potentially sensitive workspace data to that endpoint, even if the user has not yet approved the edit.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- vendor:amazon kiro ide affected < 0.8.135 fixed 0.8.135

## How to check

- Check the installed Kiro IDE version and compare it with `0.8.135`.
- Review workspace settings files in projects opened on earlier versions for an unexpected Powers registry URL.
- unknown for any other check the sources provide.

## Fix

- Upgrade Kiro IDE to `0.8.135` or later.
- Rotate any credentials present in a project opened on an earlier version.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-24T18:43:45+00:00 lab https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/2026-111-aws/ — AWS: CVE-2026-89332 - Kiro IDE Sensitive Workspace Data Exfiltration via Agent-Written Workspace Configuration
- 2026-10-24T18:53:56+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89332
- 2026-10-25T12:38:49+00:00 epss https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-89332

## Documents

- [advisory] AWS: CVE-2026-89332 - Kiro IDE Sensitive Workspace Data Exfiltration via Agent-Written Workspace Configuration https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/2026-111-aws/

## From the sources

CVE-2026-89332 - Kiro IDE Sensitive Workspace Data Exfiltration via Agent-Written Workspace Configuration

### CVE-2026-89332 - Kiro IDE Sensitive Workspace Data Exfiltration via Agent-Written Workspace Configuration

Bulletin ID: 2026-111-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 09/11/2026 12:00 PM PDT

Description:

Kiro IDE is an agentic development environment that makes it easy for developers to ship real engineering work with the help of AI agents.

We identified CVE-2026-89332, where the Kiro agent could modify a workspace's settings file in an untrusted workspace in Kiro IDE. A specially crafted repository could use this to point the Kiro Powers registry URL, which Kiro fetches when the Powers panel is opened, at an external endpoint, sending potentially sensitive workspace data to that endpoint. Kiro presented the edit to the user for approval, showing the inserted data and the URL, but the file was already written to disk, so opening the Powers panel before responding to the prompt made the request anyway.

Impacted versions: Kiro IDE < 0.8.135

Resolution:

This issue has been addressed in Kiro IDE version 0.8.135 and greater. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and rotate any credentials present in a project opened on an earlier version.

Workarounds:

None.

References:

- CVE-2026-89332

 Please email aws-security@amazon.com with any security questions or concerns.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_