Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-85243
Go to dashboardApache Camel's Crypto PGP component did not verify the integrity check on OpenPGP messages sent in the older symmetrically encrypted data packet, because that packet type carries no integrity code. An attacker who can produce or rewrite such a message in transit can alter the decrypted content without detection.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications running Apache Camel from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, or from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1, that use the Crypto PGP component to decrypt messages. The exposure depends on whether inbound messages can come from a sender or path an attacker can influence. Teams that do not use the PGP data format in unmarshal can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
camel-crypto (PGP data format) dependency and its version in the project build file, for example with mvn dependency:tree | grep camel-cryptounmarshal with the PGP data format and whether requireIntegrityProtection is setmvn dependency:list | grep camel-core4.23.04.18.54.22.1requireIntegrityProtection at its default true; if interoperating with a legacy sender requires requireIntegrityProtection=false, treat decrypted content as unauthenticatedEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in Apache Camel Crypto PGP component.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.
unmarshal() verified the modification detection code only when the message was an OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data packet. The older symmetrically encrypted data packet carries no such code, and OpenPGP's CFB mode is malleable without one, so a message using that packet skipped the check altogether. The packet type is chosen by whoever produced the message, which left the sender - or anyone able to rewrite the message in transit - deciding whether the integrity check applied at all. The existing integrity option governs marshalling only and had no decrypt-side counterpart, so a deployment could not require integrity protection on the messages it accepted.
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. A requireIntegrityProtection option, defaulting to true, now rejects a message that is not integrity protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together are what give a decrypted message authenticity and not only confidentiality. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, reject messages that do not use the integrity protected packet before they reach the data format. Routes that must interoperate with a sender still emitting the legacy packet should set requireIntegrityProtection=false after upgrading, and treat the decrypted content as unauthenticated.
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