Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-82961
Go to dashboardZephyr's GPIO syscall handlers pass a caller-supplied pin number straight to the driver without checking it, and the only check is compiled out in production builds. A user-mode thread with access to a GPIO device can use this to write out of bounds in kernel memory, escaping the user-mode sandbox toward code execution or a crash.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-28 17:34 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Only Zephyr builds with user mode enabled () where a user-mode thread has been granted access to a GPIO device object. Builds without user mode, or threads that do not touch GPIO, are not exposed by this description. The sources name STM32 and ITE IT8XXX2 controllers as examples of affected drivers.
CONFIG_USERSPACE=yNo product ranges from the sources yet.
CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and whether user-mode threads are granted access to GPIO device objectsdrivers/gpio/gpio_handlers.c in your Zephyr tree contains a gpio_port_pin_is_supported() check in z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure()Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The GPIO syscall handlers in drivers/gpio/gpio_handlers.c did not validate the pin argument supplied by a user-mode caller. z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure(), z_vrfy_gpio_pin_get_config() and z_vrfy_gpio_pin_interrupt_configure() verified only the device object (K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_GPIO() / K_SYSCALL_OBJ()) and then passed the caller-supplied gpio_pin_t straight through to z_impl_gpio_pin_*() and on to the driver. The only pin check in include/zephyr/drivers/gpio.h was __ASSERT(gpio_port_pin_is_supported(cfg->port_pin_mask, pin), ...), which compiles to nothing unless CONFIG_ASSERT is enabled, so in a production build no check existed at all.
GPIO drivers use pin as a shift count and as an array index on the documented assumption that it is a pin the controller supports. On STM32, for example, gpio_stm32_pin_interrupt_configure() turns pin into an EXTI line and stm32_gpio_intc_set_irq_callback() writes data->cb[line_num].cb and data->cb[line_num].data into a NUM_EXTI_LINES-entry array (default 16) in drivers/interrupt_controller/intc_gpio_stm32.c, guarded only by a compiled-out __ASSERT_NO_MSG(); the same function then reads exti_irq_table[line_num] and calls irq_enable() on the result. Other controllers index fixed-size per-pin configuration tables the same way — drivers/gpio/gpio_ite_it8xxx2_v2.c reads an MMIO base pointer out of wuc_base[8] with the caller's pin and performs a read-modify-write through it.
The issue is reachable only in builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y (the file is compiled under that symbol), by a user-mode thread that has been granted access to a GPIO device object. Such a grant is intended to authorize control of that port's pins; the missing validation instead lets the thread drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of a function pointer and an associated void * past a kernel .bss array, and out-of-bounds reads that feed irq_enable() and MMIO accesses — an escape from the user-mode sandbox that can lead to kernel memory corruption, arbitrary code execution, or a crash.
The fix validates pin against the controller's gpio_driver_config.port_pin_mask with gpio_port_pin_is_supported() in every pin-taking z_vrfy_ handler and returns -EINVAL otherwise, complemented by an unconditional pin >= GPIO_MAX_PINS_PER_PORT range check added to the shared z_impl_gpio_pin_*() inlines.
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