Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-78118
Go to dashboardOn multi-CPU Zephyr builds, a race between the timer expiration handler and thread abort can make the kernel write through a stale or invalid thread pointer. A local user-mode thread with CONFIG_USERSPACE can attempt to trigger it, giving out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context that most often crash the kernel.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Only multi-CPU Zephyr builds are exposed, since the affected code is a no-op on uniprocessor targets. Exploitation needs local code execution and a user-mode thread on a system with CONFIG_USERSPACE, so teams running single-core targets or without untrusted local threads can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than 1 in the device configuration.CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled, since user-mode threads are needed to drive the race.z_waitq_head() and the timer handler locking change, as listed in the NVD entry (version unknown from these sources).Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The kernel helper z_waitq_head() (kernel/include/wait_q.h) reads the head of a thread wait queue, but on SMP systems it was called from several places without holding the scheduler spinlock _sched_spinlock that serializes wait-queue mutation. The consequential call site is z_timer_expiration_handler() in kernel/timer.c, which held only the timer subsystem lock timer_lock while reading timer->wait_q and then unpending, setting the return value of, and readying the thread it obtained. halt_thread() in kernel/sched.c removes an aborted thread from its wait queue while holding only _sched_spinlock, so the two paths are not mutually exclusive.
When the last waiter is removed on another CPU inside that window, sys_dlist_peek_head() can return the list sentinel — a pointer into the k_timer object itself — typed as a struct k_thread * (with CONFIG_WAITQ_SCALABLE, rb_get_min() can return an arbitrary node of a tree being restructured), or it can return a pointer to a thread that has already been unpended and, for dynamically allocated threads, freed. The handler then calls unpend_thread_no_timeout(), which performs a sys_dlist_remove() through pointers read from that object, and arch_thread_return_value_set(), which writes unconditionally through the pointer.
The result is out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context, plus scheduler state corruption; a milder outcome is a thread that has re-pended elsewhere being woken with a success return value from an unrelated blocking call. All of the primitives needed to drive the interleaving — k_timer_start(), k_timer_status_sync(), k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() — are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled an unprivileged user-mode thread can attempt the race against kernel-owned data.
Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build (CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than one; the affected region is a no-op on uniprocessor targets), local code execution, and winning a narrow timing window, so the practical outcome is most often a kernel crash rather than controlled corruption. The fix splits the helper into z_waitq_head_locked() for callers that already hold the scheduler spinlock and a z_waitq_head() that acquires it, and brings the timer expiration handler's head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-78118")
NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain · EPSS scores by FIRST, used with attribution. Posts quoted belong to their authors.