Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-77937
Go to dashboardLetta's REST API takes the acting tenant from a client-supplied user_id HTTP header (get_headers in letta/server/rest_api/dependencies.py) and never checks it against a credential. LETTA_SERVER_SECURE only adds one shared password, so any caller who has it, or anyone at all when secure mode is off, can read and modify another tenant's agents, memory and configuration by setting user_id. Affected: through 0.16.8. No fixed version has been published.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|
| letta | pypi | <= 0.16.8 | – |
0.16.8 (docker image letta/letta tag, or pip show letta on the server host)user_id: user-<other tenant id> and see whether you get that tenant's agents0.16.8; Docker Hub 0.34.18 not confirmed as a fix)Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Letta through 0.16.8 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows API callers to impersonate other users by supplying a self-asserted user_id HTTP header. Attackers can set user_id to another tenant's ID, even with LETTA_SERVER_SECURE enabled, to read and modify that user's agents, memory and configuration.
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